The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties by Gostin, Lawrence O.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1989 
The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and 
Civil Liberties 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/772 
 
49 Ohio St. L.J. 1017-1058 (1989) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Public Health Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties
LARRY GOSTIN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
I1. A SIGNIFICANT RISK OF TRANSMISSION
A. Risk of Sexual Transmission
B. Risk of Transmission by Intravenous Drug Use
C. Saliva as a Route of Transmission: Biting and Spitting
D. An Inoculum of Blood as a Method of Transmission:
Hitting, Kicking, Splattering of Blood
E. Conclusion on Risks of Transmission
III. ISOLATION
A. Procedures for Fair and Impartial Decision Making
B. Safe Environment for Isolation
C. Disease or Status-Based Isolation
D. Modified Isolation Based upon Behavior, not
Disease Status
IV. CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION
A. General Criminal Law Theory
1. Intentional or Knowing Transmission
a. Sexual Intercourse
b. Donation of Blood
c. Spitting, Biting, and Splattering of Blood
2. Reckless or Negligent Transmission
B. Public Health or AIDS-Specific Offenses
C. Goals of the Criminal Law
V. SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION
The politics of AIDS is moving steadily in the direction of the use of compulsory
powers of the state. Some politicians have demanded isolation and criminal
confinement of "recalcitrant" AIDS carriers.' An ever increasing number of state
* J.D., Duke University. Executive Director of the American Society of Law and Medicine and Adjunct
Associate Professor, Harvard School of Public Health. The author recently completed a global survey of AIDS legislation
for the World Health Organization and a legal and policy analysis of U.S. legislation for the U.S. Secretary for Health
and Human Services. The author would like to thank Rebecca Hanson (Sarah Lawrence College), Jennifer Klein
(Columbia Law School), and Richard Timmel (Harvard Law School) for their research and editorial assistance.
1. Some politicians and commentators have called for isolation of persons with HIV who persist in spreading the
infection. See Grutsch & Robertson, The Coming of AIDS: It Didn't Start with the Homosexuals and It Won't End with
Them, 19 Amt. SPECrATOR 12 (1986); Florida Considering Locking Up Some Carriers of the AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Jan.
27, 1988, at A15, col. 1 (state officials proposing "special lock-up wards" for AIDS virus carriers); Boodman, Idaho's
Drive to Stop AIDS at the Border Arouses Doubts, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Lewin, Rights of Citizens
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legislatures have considered or enacted statutes authorizing the exercise of compul-
sory public health powers. 2
Political advocacy for a "tougher" approach to the AIDS epidemic needs to be
understood. The widespread publicity given to the potential for continued spread of
the epidemic 3 has charged political debate. In an atmosphere of public health crisis,
and with little early prospect of an effective scientific intervention, 4 there grows an
impatience with voluntary measures focused on education and counseling.
The fact that the epidemic is growing relentlessly is not the only thing that fuels
calls for coercive state action. It is also that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
is spread predominantly through volitional behavior 5 such as sodomy, prostitution,
and Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1987, at Al, col.1 (Sen. Jesse Helms and Pat Robertson
suggesting "quarantine may become necessary"). Support for criminal law sanctions has been even more vocal. See
SIXTEENTH CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN MINISTRS OF JUSICE, RESOLUTION No. 1 (Lisbon June 22, 1988) (recommending use
of criminal law to combat AIDS as a last resort); Sullivan & Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988); Squires, Spreading AIDS on Purpose, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1988 (Health), at 6; Boorstin,
Criminal and Civil Litigation on Spread of AIDS Appears, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
2. See infra notes 71, 72, 125-27, & 148 and accompanying text.
3. On December 18, 1987, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) published a full report of the Domestic
Policy Council containing an extensive review of published and unpublished data on the prevalence and incidence of HIV
infection. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of Current Knowledge, 36 MoastorrY
& MORTALITY VEEKLY RE'., (Supp. 6) 1 (1987) [hereinafter Review of Current Knowledge]. By June 6, 1988, a total of
64,506 cases of AIDS had been reported in the United States; over 14,000 of these had been reported since Jan. 1, 1988,
and 36,255 cases had resulted in death. In the previous twelve months, 23,200 cases were reported, representing an
increase of 58% over the year before. CDC, WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REFP.June 6, 1988; Quarterly Report to the Domestic
Pol'y Council on the Prevalence and Rate of Spread of HIV and AIDS in the United States, 259 J. A.M.A. 2657 (1988).
By the end of 1991 it is projected that there will be more than 270,000 cases, with more than 74,000 of those occurring
in 1991 alone. Confronting AIDS: Directions for Pub. Health, Health Care and Research, 1986. INST. OF MED., NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCIENCES, 8-9, 85-89. Confronting AIDS: Update 1988, 1988 INsT. OF MED. NAT'L ACAD. OF SncEs 51-52
[hereinafter UPDATE 1988]. These are all cases of AIDS as defined by the Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case
Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY REP. 35 (1987); Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus (HIV) Infection Codes Official Authorized Addendum ICD-9-CM (Revision No.), 36 MoRBIDrrY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Supp. 7) IS (1987). Cases of CDC-defined AIDS are only the surface of the epidemic. There
is a second epidemic of persons who harbor the virus and who show few or no symptoms. The number of persons infected
with HIV in the United States is estimated to be between 945,000 and 1.4 million people. UPDATE 1988, at 49-50. See
Harris, The AIDS Epidemic: Looking into the 1990s, 90 TECHNOL. REV. No. 5, at 58 (July 1987). These two pandemic
epidemics are connected by a towline of time-the time between infection and subsequent disease. See generally Mueller,
The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 250 (1986). This time
link between infection and disease can be measured in months or many years. It is now thought that the overwhelming
majority of infected individuals will develop serious symptomology. UPDATE 1988, at 35-36; Foreman, Virus
'Inexorably' Leads to AIDS, U.S. Study Says, Boston Globe, June 2, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
4. Development of a preventative vaccine for HIV is fraught with difficulty. Frances & Petricciani, The Prospects
for and Pathways Toward a Vaccine for AIDS, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1586 (1985); Gostin, Vaccination for AIDS: Legal
and Ethical Challenges from the Test Tube, to the Human Subject, Through to the Marketplace, 2 AIDS AND PUB. POL'Y
J. 9 (1987); Mariner & Gallo, Getting to Market: The Scientific and Legal Climate for Developing an AIDS Vaccine, 15
LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 17 (1987). Prospects for treatment appear more likely. See Yarchoan & Broder, Development
of an Antiretroviral Therapy for the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Related Disorders: Progress Report, 316
NEw ENG. J. MED. 557 (1987). Yet, the only approved treatment, azidothymidine (AZT) is not intended to be curative
and can be highly toxic. Its purpose is to help prevent the occurrence of opportunistic infections in patients who are
immunocompromised. See A Ray of Hope in the Fight Against AIDS, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 60.
5. Of the cumulative total of AIDS cases reported to the CDC, 63% were homosexual and bisexual men and 19%
were heterosexual men and women with a history of intravenous drug use. Approximately 4% of cases were attributed
to heterosexual transmission. CDC, WEEKLY SURVEILt.ANCE REP., June 6, 1988. See also, Curran, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe,
Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 SCIENCE 1352 (1985)
[hereinafter Curran & Morgan]; Gostin, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: A Review of Science, Health Policy, and
Laiv, in AIDS AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (M. Witt, ed. 1986). The pattern of "high
risk groups" is considerably different in other parts of the world. See PANos INsTITUTE, AIDS AND THE TmRD WORLD
(1988); Goldsmith, AIDS Around the World: Analyzing Complex Patterns, 259 J. A.M.A. 1917 (1988) (predominance
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and the use of intravenous drugs, which are widely regarded as immoral, even
criminal. Because the virus is primarily transmitted by intentional behavior that is
within the control of the carrier, it is seen as susceptible to a legal, rather than a public
health, solution.
The use of compulsory public health powers can be a visible political symbol of
seriousness of purpose in controlling AIDS. Public opinion polls consistently show
some support for coercive action, with a significant proportion of respondents
favoring "quarantine" of people with AIDS "in special places to keep them away
from the general public.''6 A majority of respondents also favor governmental
restrictions on the sexual activities of known AIDS carriers. 7
Public health authorities have resisted political and public pressure for the use of
coercive powers. 8 Instead, they have relied upon education and counseling of high
risk groups to encourage behavioral changes. Experience with hepatitis B has
demonstrated that voluntary compliance can reduce the spread of a virus with an
analogous pattern of transmission,9 and emerging evidence on AIDS shows signifi-
cant alterations of high risk behavior.10 Furthermore, experience with the use of
coercive measures in venereal disease control shows that they can be ineffective,
discriminatory, and invidious." Absent evidence that personal control measures
change behavior more effectively than voluntary education and counseling, govern-
ment cannot justify their use. The behaviors sought to be controlled or punished are
highly ingrained, intimate, and deeply human activities. Coercive state action is a
particularly crude tool to compel change in these behaviors.
Compulsory public powers are justified only if they meet the following criteria:
there is a significant risk of transmission of the AIDS virus; the public health response
is efficacious in preventing a primary mode of transmission of the virus; the
of heterosexual transmission in Africa); Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-Worldwvide, 259 J.
A.M.A. 3104 (1988).
6. In five national opinion polls conducted between Sept. 1985 and Jan. 1986, between 28% and 51% of
respondents said "[pleople with AIDS should be put into quarantine in special places to keep them away from the general
public." Singer, Rogers & Corcoran, The Polls-A Report: AIDS, 51 PUB. OFiNioN Q. 580, 591-92 (1987). See Growing
Concern, Greater Precautions, NEwswEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 30, 32; Poll Indicates Majority Favor Quarantinefor AIDS
Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, at A24, col. 1.
7. Two national opinion polls conducted in Nov. 1985 and Jan. 1986 found that 58% and 51%, respectively, of
the respondents believed that "'governmental restrictions should be placed on the sexual activities of people who are
known carriers of AIDS." Singer, Rogers & Corcoran, supra note 6, at 592.
8. The United States Public Health Service relies on public education and counseling to encourage behavior
change and has not advocated the use of compulsion. See PHS Task Force on AIDS, Public Health Service Plan for the
Prevention and Control ofAcquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985); U.S. Dep't
Health & Human Services, Guidelines for AIDS Prevention Program Operations (1987); Accord, WoRLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL PROGRAMME ON AIDS, GUIDING OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE COORDINATION
OF GLOBAL AND NATIONAL AIDS AcrivrriEs, GPAJERI88.2 (1988).
9. Blumberg & Fox, The Daedalus Effect: Changes in Ethical Questions Relating to Hepatitis B, 102 ANNALS
INTERN. MED. 390 (1985).
10. Becker & Joseph, AIDS andBehavioral Change to Reduce Risk: A Review, 78 At. J. PUB. HEALTH 394 (1988);
Self Reported Behavioral Change Among Gay and Bisexual Men-San Francisco, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTAULTY WEEKLY
REP. 613 (1985); Weller, Hindley & Adler, Gonorrhea in Homosexual Men, and Media Coverage of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome in London 1982-83, 289 BRIT. MED. J. 1041 (1984).
11. See A. BRANDT, No MAGic BuLuET A SOCIAL HtSTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNrTD STATES SINCE 1880,
at 84-97, 156-60 (1985, Rev. Ed. 1987); Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 231, 231-33 (1986); Brandt, AIDS in Historical Perspective: Four Lessonsfrom the History of Sexually Transmitted
Diseases, 78 Amt. J. PUB. HEALTH 367, 369-70 (1988).
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economic, practical, or human rights burdens are not disproportionate to the public
health benefits; and the public health power is the least restrictive alternative that
would prevent viral transmission. 12
These proposed criteria are intended to demonstrate two realities in public
health. First, a compulsory power needs vigorous justification and should not be
imposed merely because it is dressed in the guise of public health. Thus, there must
be reliable epidemiologic evidence that the virus can, and probably will, be
transmitted by the person's behavior; and that the exercise of the power will prevent
the transmission of the virus. Second, while the health of the community is often an
overriding public value, it is not absolute. In each case the public good to be achieved
must be balanced against the costs of the policy. If the invasion of human rights, the
financial cost, or the practical burdens of the policy are wholly disproportionate to the
benefits, it should not be adopted. There are instances where compulsory powers are
necessary to prevent a clear likelihood that the virus will be transmitted. However, I
will demonstrate that many compulsory powers have been, and will be, exercised in
cases where they serve no overriding public purpose.
In the following section I carefully examine the levels of risk posed by behavior
which can potentially transmit HIV. It is essential to understand the relative risks of
such behavior as a foundation for the rest of this Article, which analyzes two major
proposals for coercive state action: isolation of carriers of HIV and criminal
prosecution for transmission of HIV.
This Article will demonstrate that these compulsory state powers have little
place in fighting a disease epidemic.
II. A SIGNIFICANT RISK OF TRANSMISSION
A threshold question in assessing the value of a compulsory public health power
is whether there is a significant risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. Public health
powers have been advocated or used in cases where the person's behavior was highly
unlikely to transmit the AIDS virus-biting, spitting, splattering of blood, or
donating blood.
The imposition of compulsory powers in these types of cases is misplaced for
two reasons. First, the compulsory powers will have little public utility if the risk
posed by the person's behavior is exceedingly small. The resources placed into
preventing low risk behavior are not well spent, for even if the behavior can be
prevented, it is unlikely to have any effect on the spread of the epidemic. Second,
focusing on low risk behaviors of AIDS carriers is iniquitous, for society already
tolerates other activities that pose equal or greater risks. It is important to examine the
relative risk when assessing sanctions against AIDS carriers. For example, a decision
to incarcerate an AIDS carrier for biting or spitting ignores the fact that this behavior
poses a much lower risk of serious harm than other behavior, such as dangerous
driving, for which there is often no significant criminal liability.
12. See generally, Gostin, Curran & Clark, The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS-
Testing. Screening and Reporting, 12 A,. J. L. & MED. 7, 21-24 (1986).
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The concept of "significant risk" is well recognized in public health law.
Modern courts have consistently required a clear public health justification for any
personal control measure. 13 Yet the concept of "significant risk" has never been
clarified or defined. It should be based upon epidemiologic evidence of the gravity of
the harm and the probability of the harm occurring. A risk is significant only if the
mode of transmission is scientifically well established, there is a reasonable
likelihood that viral transmission will take place, and the potential harm is serious.
Below I examine the various modes of transmission of the AIDS virus and the level
of risk posed.
A. Risk of Sexual Transmission
Sexual intercourse is a primary mode of transmission of HIV. 14 HIV is much less
easily communicated than other sexually transmitted diseases, such as hepatitis B,
syphilis and gonorrhea.' 5 The range of the risk of transmission of HIV in a prolonged
sexual relationship is 7 to 68% that the virus will be transmitted. 16 Transmission
through anal-receptive intercourse is considered more efficient, 17 although it is
thought that individual host susceptibility' 8 and variations in infectivity 19 among
different people may be additional factors. Transmission from male-to-female is well
13. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 1913 (1987)
(school teacher with tuberculosis could not be fired unless she posed a "significant risk" to health); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979) (mentally retarded children who were carriers of serum
hepatitis could not be excluded from regular public school classes because the health hazard was only a remote
possibility); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(the automatic exclusion of school children with AIDS would effect a purpose having no adequate connection with public
health).
14. See UPDATE 1988, at 38-45; Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1128-1130 (1987); Peterman, Stoneburner, Allen, Jaffe & Curran, Risk of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Transmission from Heterosexual Adults with Transfusion-Associated Infections, 259 J. A.M.A. 55 (1988); Review
of Current Knowledge, supra note 3, at 2-4.
15. Peterman & Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 256 J. A.M.A. 2222 (1986)
(Transmission rate of Neisseria gonorrhoeae after a single sexual exposure is 22-25% for a man and 50% for a woman).
16. See generally Allain, Prevalence of HTLV-lllLAVAntibodies in Patients with Hemophilia and in their Sexual
Partners in France, 315 NEw Eao. J. MEo. 517 (1986); Fischl, Dickinson, Scott, Klimas, Fletcher & Parks, Evaluation
of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and Household Contacts ofAdults with AIDS, 257 J. A.M.A. 640 (1987) [hereinafter
Fischl & Dickinson]; Kreiss, Kitchen, Prince, Kasper & Essex, Antibody to Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III in
Wives of Hemophiliacs: Evidence for Heterosexual Transmission, 102 ANNALs INTERN. Mao. 623 (1985); Mann, Quinn,
Francis, Nzilambi, Bosenge, Bila, McCormick, Ruti, Asila & Curran, Prevalence of HTLV-Ill/LAV in Household
Contacts of Patients with Confirmed AIDS and Controls in Kinshasa, Zaire, 256 J. A.M.A. 721, (1986) [hereinafter
Mann & Quinn]; Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Sarngadharan, Bodner, Folks, Ballou, Wright & Gallo, Frequent
Transmission of HTL V-11IAmong Spouses of Patients with AIDS-Related Complex and AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 1571 (1985)
[hereinafter Redfield & Markham].
17. Goedert, Sarngadharan, Biggar, Winn, Greene, Mann, Gallo, Sarngadharan, Weiss, Grossman, Bodner,
Strong & Blattner, Determinants of Retrovirus (HTLV-Ill) Antibody and Immunodeficiency Conditions in Homosexual
Men, 2 LA cr 711 (1984); Kingsley, Kaslow, Rinaldo, Jr., Detre, Odaka, Van Raden, Detels, Polk, Chmiel, Kelsey,
Ostrow & Visscher, Risk Factors for Seroconversion to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Male Homosexuals, I
LA Tc-r 345 (1987); Winkelstein, Lyman, Padian, Grant, Samual, Wiley, Anderson, Lang, Riggs & Levy, Sexual
Practices and Risk of Infection by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: The San Francisco Men's Health Study, 257 J.
A.M.A. 321, 325 (1987).
18. Eales, Nye, Parkin, Weber, Forster & Harris, Association of Different Allelic Forms of Group Specific
Component with Susceptibility to and Clinical Manifestation of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 1 LANcET 999,
999, 1001-02 (1987).
19. Dahl, Martin & Miller, Differences Among Human Immunodeficiency Virus Strains in their Capacities to
Induce Cytolysis or Persistent Infection of a Lymphoblustoid Cell Line Immortalized by Epstein-Barr Virus, 61 J.
VIROLOGY 1602 (1987).
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documented, 20 but female-to-male transmission is more controversial. Clearly
female-to-male transmission occurs, but it has been less frequent in the United
States.2'
The level of risk of contracting HIV from one unprotected sexual contact with
an infected partner is thought to be low. One study placed the seroconversion rate at
approximately 1/1,000.22 While the use of barrier contraception is not entirely safe,
it does provide important protection. 23 Frequent and appropriate use of barrier
protection clearly attenuates the rate of seroconversion. 24 The risk of contracting HIV
in a single sexual encounter while using a condom (assuming 90% effectiveness of
such a barrier) is estimated to be 1/10,000.25
Prostitution is a major target of coercive AIDS legislation. 26 Yet the primary risk
factor for HIV infection in prostitutes in the United States is not sexual practice but
intravenous drug use.2 7 Further, prostitutes often seek to use protection against
exchange of body fluids. Their clients appear to pose as significant a health threat to
the prostitutes as the prostitutes to their clients. "Scientists are not certain how
frequently prostitutes have been infected because of their multiple sexual contacts, or
how often they have infected their customers, although the available evidence...
indicates that this has not occurred on a large scale.' '28
B. Risk of Transmission by Intravenous Drug Use
Intravenous drug use has a major role in the transmission of HIV. 29 IV drug
users can spread HIV through their practice of sharing drug "paraphernalia" or
"works" (needles and syringes). Sharing of works often occurs in "shooting
galleries" where addicts purchase their drugs and rent needles and syringes. The
20. The majority of cases of heterosexual transmission in the United States are women. Review of Current
Knowledge, supra note 3; Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1129. HIV is found in semen in relatively large
concentrations. See generally Ho, Schooley, Rota, Kaplan & Flynn, HTLV-Ill in the Semen and Blood of a Healthy
Heterosexual Man, 226 SciEscE 451 (1984).
21. In Africa, female-to-male transmission has been well documented. Quinn, Mann, Curran & Piot, AIDS in
Africa: An Epidemiologic Paradigm, 234 SciEscE 955 (1986). But the frequency in the U.S. is much less clear. Friedland
& Klein, supra note 14, at 1129-30.
22. Padian, Wiley & Winkelstein, Male to Female Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Current
Results, Infectivity Rates, and San Francisco Population Seroprevalence Estimates. Presented at the Third International
Conference on AIDS, Washington D.C., June 4, 1987. See Padian, Marquis, Francis, Anderson, Rutherford, O'Malley
& Winkelstein, Male-to-Female Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. A.M.A. 788 (1987).
23. Gostin & Curran, Response from Gostin & Curran, 77 AM. J. PUn. HEALTH 1553 (1987).
24. Conant, Hardy, Sernatinger, Spicer & Levy, Condoms Prevent Transmission of AIDS-AssociatedRetrovirus,
255 J. A.M.A. 1706 (1986); Fischl & Dickinson, supra note 16, at 641; Voeller & Potts, Has the Condom Any Proved
Value in Preventing the Transmission of Sexually Viral Disease-for Example Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
291 B~srr. MEo. J. 1196 (1985).
25. Hagen, Myer & Pauker, Routine Preoperative Screening for HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outveigh the
Risk to the Patient?, 259 J. A.M.A. 1357, 1358 (1988).
26. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text for comments on the use of coercive powers.
27. See Rosenberg & Weiner, Prostitutes and AIDS: A Health Department Priority? 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 418
(1988); Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Female Prostitutes, 36 MotBDITY & MoRTALtry WEEKLY REP. 157
(1987) (Table 2); Review of Current Knowledge, supra note 3, at 8.
28. Altman, U.S. Study Examines Prostitutes and AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
29. Twenty-five percent of all AIDS cases in the U.S. have occurred in IV drug users, and 17% have occurred
among those in whom IV drug use is the only risk factor. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1127; Review of Current
Knowledge, supra note 3, at 14.
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sharing experience is often part of the culture of the drug dependent population,
indicating a sense of camaraderie. Drugs are injected into a suitable vein and thus,
when the needle is shared, it is likely to have traces of blood.30 Studies have
documented needle sharing as a method of transmission of HIV. 3t However, it is
likely that the amount of blood on the needle is minute. 32 Accordingly, the rate of
seroconversion in any single case of percutaneous exposure to the needle is likely to
be small-ranging from a rate of .03-.09%. 33 However, episodes of injections by
individual drug users may number in the thousands, so the cumulative risk of IV drug
use is high. 34
C. Saliva as a Route of Transmission: Biting and Spitting
HIV has been isolated from saliva.35 The isolation of virus from a body fluid
does not necessarily mean that the fluid is a significant mode of transmission.
Transmission by biting or spitting, however, continues to be a societal concern, one
which has resulted in the filing of criminal charges. 36
There are strong grounds for believing the risk of transmission by saliva to be
exceedingly low, approaching zero. First, HIV has been isolated in saliva only rarely
and in very small amounts. 37 It is thought that the risk of transmission from a small
inoculum of virus in a single event is remote.38 Second, experiments indicate that
both whole saliva and saliva filtrates contain components that inactivate HIV in
vitro. 39 Third, there has never been a documented case of transmission by saliva,
despite close observation and follow-up investigations of cases of biting, spitting,
deep kissing, and intimate caring activities.40 There has been one report, for example,
of an adult patient with AIDS who bit thirty health care workers without any
transmission of the virus. 4 1 Several other follow-up studies of biting have revealed no
30. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1127-28; Ginzburg, Intravenous Drug Abusers and HIV Infections: A
Consequence of TheirActions, 14 Law, MED. & HALTH CARE 268, 269-70 (1986).
31. See generally Chaisson, Moss, Onishi, Osmond & Carlson, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
Heterosexual Intravenous Drug Users in San Francisco, 77 Am. J. Pun. HEALTH 169 (1987); Des Jarlais, Friedman &
Stoneburner, HIV Infection and Intravenous Drug Use: Critical Issues in Transmission Dynamics, Infection Outcomes
and Prevention, 10 REv. INFECT. Dis. 151 (1988); Friedland, Harris, Butkus-Small, Shine, Moll, Darrow & Klein,
Intravenous Drug Abusers and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Demographic, Drug Use, and
Needle-Sharing Patterns, 145 ARCHVES INTERN. MED. 1413 (1985).
32. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1128.
33. Id. at 1126.
34. Id. at 1128.
35. Groopman, Salahuddin, Sarngadharan, Markham, Gorda, Sliski & Gallo, HTLV-Il in Saliva of People with
AIDS-Related Complex and Healthy Homosexual Men at Risk for AIDS, 226 SCIENCE 447 (1984); Hoe, Byington,
Schooley, Flynn, Rota & Hirsch, Infrequency ofIsolation of HTLV-Ill Virus from Saliva in AIDS, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1606 (1985) [hereinafter Hoe & Byington].
36. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
37. Lifson, Do Alternative Modes of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist? 259 J. A.M.A. 1353
(1988). In one study of men infected with HIV, the virus could be isolated in 28 of 50 samples of blood but in only I of
83 samples of saliva. Hoe & Byington, supra note 35.
38. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1126-27.
39. Fultz, Components of Saliva Inactivate Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 2 LANcEr 1215 (1986).
40. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1132-33; Lifson, supra note 37, at 1353-54.
41. Tsoukas, Hadjis, Theberge, et al., Risk of Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV from Human Bites, presented at the
Second International Conference on AIDS, Paris, June 23-25, 1986.
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evidence of HIV transmission. 42 There are also no documented cases of HIV
transmission through kissing or insertive oral-genital contact. 43 Fourth, there have
been major population studies of households, dentists, and healthcare workers in
intimate contact with HIV infected persons, without viral transmission.44 Households
with an HIV infected member have been studied over a period of years. In these
families there were repeated exposures to saliva. They shared eating utensils, plates,
drinking glasses, and toothbrushes; towels, linens, and clothes were sometimes soiled
with saliva; family members helped patients to eat and drink; and they kissed on the
cheek and on the lips. These studies involved nearly five hundred members of various
families, yet failed to find a single case of a family member who contracted HIV who
did not have an additional exposure through a blood transfusion, sexual relations, or
perinatal transmission.45
The risk of transmission by saliva has also been studied among dental workers
who have had repeated exposure to saliva as well as blood. In one study of 1309
dental professionals (72% of whom treated high risk patients and 94% of whom
reported accidental puncture wounds), only one had HIV.46 This one report is thought
to have been from blood exposure. Other studies have not found another case of
transmission to a dentist. 47
Similar studies have been done with health workers who care for HIV-infected
patients. 48 These studies also have failed to document a case of HIV transmission
with parenteral, mucous membrane, or open wound exposures to saliva;49 cardiopul-
42. Drummond, Seronegative 18 Months After Being Bitten by a Patient with AIDS, 256 J. A.M.A. 2342 (1986).
But see Wahn, Kramer, Voit, Bruster, Scrampical & Scheid, Horizontal Transmission of HIV Infection Between Two
Siblings, 2 LAscur 694 (1986) (Authors conclude one plausible, though unlikely, route of transmission between brothers
was through a bite, even though it did not break skin or result in bleeding.).
43. Lifson, supra note 37, at 1353-54.
44. These studies are reviewed in: Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1131-33; Gostin, Curran & Clark, supra
note 12, at 22 n.3.
45. Fisehl & Dickinson, supra note 16; Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of
Transmission of HTLV-IlI/LA V Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS orAIDS-related complex with Oral
Candidiasis, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344 (1986); Jason, MeDougal, Dixon, Lawrence, Kennedy, Hilgartner, Aledort &
Evatt, HTLV-111/LAV Antibody with Immune Status of Household Contacts and Sexual Partners of Persons with
Hemophilia, 255 J. A.M.A. 212 (1986); Lawrence, Jason, Bouhasin, MeDougal, Knutsen, Evatt & Joist, HTLV-IIIILAV
Antibody Status of Spouses and Household Contacts Assisting in Home Infusion of Hemophilia Patients, 66 BLOOD 703
(1985); Mann & Quinn, supra note 16; Redfield & Markham, supra note 16.
46. Klein, Phelan, Freeman, Schable, Friedland, Trieger & Steigbigel, Low Occupational Risk of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Dental Professionals, 318 NEW ENG. J. Man. 86 (1988). (Several letters to the
editor in response to this article are in 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 112-14 (1988).).
47. Gerberding, Bryant-LeBlanc, Nelson, Moss, Osmond, Chambers, Carlson, Drew, Levy & Sonde, Risk of
Transmitting the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Cytomegalovirus, and Hepatitis B Virus to Health Care Workers
Exposed to Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Conditions, 156 J. INsEcr. Dis. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter Gerberding &
Bryant-LeBlanc].
48. Gerberding & Bryant-LeBlane, supra note 47; Henderson, Saah, Zak, Kaslow, Lane, Folks, Blackwelder,
Schmitt, LaCamera, Masur & Fauci, Risk of Nosocomial Infection with Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type
lII/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in a Large Cohort of Intensively Exposed Health Care Workers, 104 ANNALs
INTERN. MED. 644 (1986) [hereinafter Henderson & Saah]; Hirsch, Wormser, Schooley, Ho, Felsenstein, Hopkins, Joline,
Duncanson, Sargadharar, Saxinger & Gallo, Risk of Nosocomial Infection with Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus I11
(HTLV-Ill), 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1 (1985); McCray & The Cooperative Needlestick Surveillance Group, Occupational
Risk of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among Health Care Workers, 314 NEw ENGo. J. MED. 1127 (1986)
[hereinafter McCray & Needlestick Group]; Weiss, Saxinger, Rechtman, Greico, Nadler, Holman, Ginzburg, Groopman,
Goedert, Markham, Gallo, Blattner & Landsman, HTLV-Ill Infection Among Health Care Workers: Association with
Needle-Stick Injuries, 254 J. A.M.A. 2089 (1985).
49. McCray & Needlestick Group, supra note 48.
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monary resuscitation; 50 and performance of invasive procedures with direct exposure
to saliva.5' Nearly all documented cases of occupational transmission of HIV in
health care settings have been attributed to accidental needlestick injuries or mucous
membrane exposure to large amounts of blood. 52
Of more than 60,000 cases of AIDS reported to the Centers for Disease Control,
none have implicated saliva as a likely cause of transmission.5 3 One recent reviewer
of the medical literature noted that, given these data, the risk of transmission by saliva
is still only "theoretical" or "negligible."- 5 4
D. An Inoculum of Blood as a Method of Transmission: Hitting, Kicking,
Splattering of Blood
HIV has been isolated in blood. 55 Blood represents a significant method of
transmission when there is a large inoculum. 56 Thus, transfusions of blood and blood
products have been implicated as major routes of transmission.5 7 It is the importance
of blood transmissions as a risk factor for AIDS that has worried policy makers about
scrapes, bruises, and bleeding occurring while there is physical contact with HIV
infected persons. Thus, aggressive acts such as hitting, kicking, or splattering of
blood by HIV infected people have been viewed as much more serious than the same
behavior by non-infected persons.
These aggressive behaviors, however, do not involve a large inoculum of HIV
infected blood into the body. Rather, they often involve either a small inoculum of
blood or, more likely, no exposure to blood inside the body.5 8 This shows that a
single event of this kind poses a very low, or negligible, risk. The risk of transmission
of HIV even after a deep parenteral exposure to infected blood is estimated to be in
the range of .03-.09%.59
50. Saviteer, White, Cohen & Jason, HTLV.II Exposure During Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 313 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1606 (1985).
51. Gerberding & Bryant-LeBlanc, supra note 47.
52. See supra note 48; Allen, Health Care Workers and the Risk of HIV Transmission, HASnNGS CEN. REP. 2-5
(April, May 1988); Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health Care Settings, 36 MORBIDrrY &
MORTALrY WEEKLY REP. (Supp. 2) 35 (1987) [hereinafter Recommendations, 36, 1987].
53. Review of Current Knowledge, supra note 3.
54. Lifson, supra note 37, at 1354.
55. Barre-Sinoussi, Chermann, Rey, Nugeyre, Chamaret, Gruest, Dauguet & Axler-Blin, Isolation of a
T-Lymphotropic Retrovirusfrom a Patient at Risk for the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 ScIENCE 868
(1983); Gallo, Salahuddin, Popovic, Shearer, Kaplan, Haynes, Palker, Redfield, Oleske, Safai, White, Foster &
Markham, Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk
for AIDS, 224 ScieCE 500 (1984).
56. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, 1126-27.
57. Approximately 3% of adults and 13% of children have acquired AIDS through transfusions. CDC, WEEKLY
SuRvmL.xNcE REP., July 4, 1988. Most transfusion-related cases occurred before screening for HIV antibody was
technically possible. It is thought that, with current screening programs, the incidence of transfusion-related infections are
low. See Gostin, Curran & Clark, supra note 12, at 13-17.
58. Friedland & Klein, supra note 14.
59. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1127 (1987) (placing the average level of risk of HIV transmission
at 0.76%). See also Gerberding & Bryant-LeBlanc, supra note 47 (a study of 270 health care workers found no evidence
of HIV transmission from occupational exposure); Henderson & Saah, supra note 48, at 647. MeCray & Needlestick
Group, supra note 48, at 1131; MeEvoy, Porter, Mortimer, Simmons & Shanson, Prospective Study of Clinical,
Laboratory, and Ancillary Staff with Accidental Exposures to Blood or Body Fluids from Patients Infected with HIV, 294
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There have been only sixteen reported cases of occupational exposure to HIVA0
This appears insignificant, given the frequency of contact between health care
workers and infected patients.
The spillage of blood on skin surfaces is not thought to pose a significant risk.
But two cases of seroconversion of health care workers from mucous membrane
exposures to infected blood6l raised the level of public anxiety. The fact that these
cases occurred demonstrates that HIV can be transmitted through a non-parenteral
exposure to blood. However, the two cases involved virtual soaking in blood, without
adequate precautions taken such as use of gloves. In each case the health care worker
also had significant breaks in the skin allowing access to the virus; blood also soaked
through mucous membranes. There is no data quantifying the risk of surface skin
exposure to blood. However, it is reasonable to assume the risk is less than that
caused by an injection of blood from a contaminated needle. This would place the risk
of surface skin exposure even to a large amount of blood well below 1%.62
E. Conclusion on Risks of Transmission
There is a strong consensus in the scientific literature that transmission of HIV
occurs only through an inoculation of blood, sexual intercourse, or perinatally. The
law should carefully reflect this scientific understanding by focusing its interventions
on those behaviors which pose significant risks. Even in the area of greatest
concern-sexual transmission-the risk of a single event (particularly if barrier
protection is utilized) is very low, and probably comparable to other risks which are
well accepted in society.
Public concern has often focused on the aggressive behavior of "recalcitrants"
who bite, kick, spit, or splatter their blood, because of the theoretical possibility that
HIV can be transmitted. Scientists cannot rule out the possibility that these alternative
modes of transmission may occur in the future. An unrealistic requirement for
absolute certainty persists, despite the knowledge that it is impossible scientifically to
prove that an event cannot occur. Society seems prepared to deprive HIV-infected
persons of their liberty, under the mantle of public health, for taking remote risks.
The exercise of compulsory powers is based upon unproven fears, perhaps preju-
dices, and not upon rational assessment of scientific facts.
III. ISOLATION
Infection control measures have long rested on the assumption that disease
carders must be physically separated from the rest of the population to prevent
BRrr. MFD.J. 1595 (1987) (less than 1% chance of developing HIV from a single exposure); Recommendations 36, 1987,
supra note 52, at 3.
60. See generally id. (This is a composite total from all of the sources cited.).
61. Barnes, Health Care Workers and AIDS: Questions Persist, 241 SciENcE 161 (1988). See Gostin, Hospitals,
Health Care Professionals and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Care Status of Patients and Professionals, MD.
L. Rsv. (in press); and Update: Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Health-Care Workers Exposed to Blood of
Infected Patients, 36 MORBIDrry & MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 285 (1987).
62. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 14, at 1126-27 1131-33.
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transmission of the infectious agent. Although the terms "isolation" and "quar-
antine" are often used interchangeably, both in public health statutes and in common
parlance, there is a technical distinction between them. "Isolation" is the separation
of infected persons from others during the period of communicability so as to prevent
transmission of the infectious agent; "quarantine" is the detention of persons who are
healthy, but have been exposed to a communicable disease, to prevent contact with
persons not exposed. 63 Since proposals for confining persons with AIDS tend to
target persons who already exhibit symptoms of the disease or who demonstrably
have been exposed to the virus, the term "isolation" is more appropriate.
Isolation is a particularly antiquated public health notion. It was designed in a
very different era and intended for diseases of a character wholly different from that
of AIDS. At the time most of these public health statutes were written, the sciences
of virology and epidemiology were in their infancy. 64 A crude tradition of isolation
and quarantine of real and suspected cases was the rule, sometimes involving
separation of an entire geographic area, although there was no understanding of the
mechanism by which the disease spread or how to interrupt it.65
Modern public health interventions are founded upon a more sophisticated
understanding of disease processes. Science more precisely understands the etiolog-
ical agents of infectious diseases, the most likely harborers of the agent, the most
efficient modes of its transmission, and the methods of modifying behaviors or
environments in order to interrupt its spread.
Accordingly, modern measures for reducing the spread of disease are predom-
inantly based upon research, education, and counseling, specifically targeted to
groups at risk of spreading or contracting the disease. Public health statutes and
judicial review of public health action should reflect these scientific realities by
requiring public health measures to interrupt only the most efficient modes of disease
transmission. The public health benefit is thus maximized, while restrictions of
individual liberty remain limited to those clearly necessary for community health. 66
AIDS does not display the paradigmatic conditions that call for isolation. HIV
is not transmitted by casual contact with others; it is not an airborne disease which is
spread by coughing or sneezing; and it is not transmissable by touching, kissing, or
other social activities. 67 AIDS is transmitted only by specific, conscious behavior.
Therefore, to isolate those who are infected with HIV, yet who do not engage in this
behavior, lacks any useful purpose.
At present, few state public health statutes authorize the isolation of persons with
AIDS. Many states authorize the isolation of persons infected with venereal or
sexually transmitted diseases, but for the most part AIDS is not so classified. 68
63. See. e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 2520, 2525 (Vest 1976).
64. See generally, Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 461, 463-65 (1986); Parmet,
AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFsTRA L. REv. 53 (1985).
65. See, e.g.. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (court found that quarantine area was too
large and unrelated to effective disease control).
66. See Gostin. supra note 64, at 464-65.
67. See supra notes 14-62 and accompanying text.
68, W. CURRAN, L. GOSTIN & M. CLARK, ACQUIRED IIMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME: LEGAL AND REGULATORY POLICY
ANALYSIS i-ii, 204-07 (1986. republished by U.S. Dep't of Comm. 1988).
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Although AIDS is classified as a communicable disease in many states, 69 that
designation alone does not provide a legal basis for the imposition of personal control
measures. Similarly, the fact that all states require that AIDS cases be reported to
public health officials does not, in and of itself, provide legal justification for
isolating infected persons. 70
To be sure, many state legislatures have considered bills to make AIDS, and
even HIV infection, isolable conditions. 71 A number of these states have already
enacted statutes authorizing the isolation of persons with HIV. Some of these statutes
do not mention the AIDS virus specifically, but would probably justify the detention
of AIDS virus carriers. 72
Two different kinds of isolation statute exist: those which authorize confinement
on the basis of disease status alone, and those which authorize confinement of
infected persons who engage in dangerous behavior. The distinction between
antiquated disease-based isolation and more modern behavior-based isolation is
pivotal, because one is concerned with an immutable health status, while the other is
more directly targeted to prevent dangerous acts.
Isolation, whether disease- or behavior-based, is a uniquely serious form of
deprivation of liberty because it can be utilized against a competent and unwilling
person without criminal conviction.73 It fully restricts the personal liberty of a rational
adult, not out of concern for that person's welfare, but out of concern for the welfare
of others. Furthermore, it is a form of preventive confinement based upon what a
69. Id. at ii. See generally id. at 1-208.
70. Id. at ii, 204 (summarizing findings presented at 1-179).
71. Some states specifically mention HIV in the statute, making it an isolable condition. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT., §§ 25-4-1401 to -1410 (Bradford Supp. 1987). (When a person is or is reasonably believed to be infected with HIV,
the state or local health department may order the person to be examined and tested, to visit a health worker's office for
counseling, or to cease and desist from specified dangerous conduct. If a person violates a cease and desist order, personal
restrictions can be imposed as necessary to prevent dangerous conduct. A person's failure to comply with the statute can
result in a criminal penalty.); 1987 MINN. SEss. LAW Smv., § 209 S.F. No. 1048 (West). Other states simply add HIV
to the list of communicable diseases which are isolable, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1988), or classify HIV as a
sexually transmitted disease subject to isolation, see, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.410 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
Finally, some states have only considered proposals for making AIDS an isolable disease. These states include Hawaii,
South Carolina, and Washington. Virginia and Pennsylvania have both passed gentle probing measures authorizing
investigations into the adequacy of existing state laws and regulations for disease control. See generally Gostin & Ziegler,
A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAW, ME. & HEALTH CARE 5
(1987); Curran, Clark & Gostin, AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of Traditional Disease Control
Measures, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CAiE 27 (1987); R. MaERrT, C. THOMAS & A. ZiEGLER. AIDS-RELATED BiaLs
CONSIDEOE IN THE 1986 LEGISLATIVE SESSION (1987); C. THOiAS, A SYNOPSIS OF STATE RELATED LEGISLtION (1987);
Sullivan & Field, supra note 1, at 144 n.18.
72. See, e.g., 1987 ALA. CODE § 22-1 IA-18 (Supp. 1988) (authorizes public health officials to isolate persons with
sexually transmitted diseases if they may expose others to the disease and confinement is necessary to protect the public
health); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-221 (West 1986) (authorizes each health director to order an individual confined
if there are reasonable grounds to believe he or she is infected with a communicable disease and is unwilling or unable
to act in a manner so as not to expose others); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.28 (West Supp. 1988) (authorizes public health
authorities to isolate a person to prevent the "probable spread of a sexually transmitted disease, until such time as the
condition can be corrected or the threat to the public health is eliminated or reduced.") IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.54 (Vest
Supp. 1988) (allows the secretary for health or local health officers to restrict people who have a communicable disease
and who may be endangering the public health).
73. See generally, Curran, Clark & Gostin, supra note 71; Ford & Quam, AIDS Quarantine: The Legal and
Practical Implications, 8 J. LEGAL Mao. 353 (1987); Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND TE LAW:
A GUIDE FOR T'E PuBauc 47 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987); Merritt, Communicable Disease Control and Constitutional
Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (1986); Parmet, supra note 64; Sullivan & Field, supra note 1.
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person might do rather than what he or she has already done. Isolation, therefore,
relies upon predictions of dangerousness. The law is usually loath to confine
individuals for acts they have yet to commit, 74 especially when these individuals are
rational and competent adults, and their behavior is assumed to conform to legal
standards. Even more telling is the fact that isolation has no temporal limitation;
indeed, inasmuch as seropositive people are presumed to be infectious for the rest of
their lives, isolation amounts to a kind of civil life sentence. Unlike a criminal
sentence, however, the duration of isolation is not necessarily proportionate to the
gravity of the behavior. Rather, consensual sexual behavior (or even less serious acts
such as spitting or biting) could result in lifelong confinement. State legislators and
public health authorities ought to consider these adverse consequences before they
adopt isolation.
Next, I review two legal prerequisites for any program of isolation-that
procedural due process must be afforded before exercising a power to isolate an
individual, and that the place of isolation should do no harm to the subject. I will then
further consider the constitutionality and merits of programs for disease-based and
behavior-based isolation.
A. Procedures for Fair and Impartial Decision Making
In addition to specifying standards for restraining individuals, a scheme for the
control of communicable disease must identify the decision makers and describe a
process for gathering information and making fair and correct decisions. Most state
statutes delegate wide discretion to public health officials without carefully consid-
ering procedural safeguards designed to achieve both a more accurate fact finding
process and greater fairness to the individual whose liberty is to be restrained.
Many public health statutes are either silent or wholly inconsistent in their
provision of procedural due process protections to subjects of compulsory powers.
California law, for example, authorizes the California Department of Health Services
to identify and then quarantine or isolate individuals having a communicable disease
whenever, in its judgment, such action is necessary to protect or preserve the public
health.75 Similar language is found in many public health statutes across the
country.76
A few statutes do mandate application to a judge or magistrate for an order of
isolation or quarantine, but fail to specify any other procedural requirements. 77 Even
74. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld preventive detention of persons charged with offenses. United States v.
Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101-02 (1987) (preventive confinement for persons on bail); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984) (preventive confinement of persons charged with juvenile offenses). It has also repeatedly upheld the detention of
persons who are mentally ill and thought dangerous. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). But barring such special circumstances the Court has traditionally been suspect
of preventive confinement.
75. CAL. HEALTH & SArTY CODE § 3051 (vest 1979).
76. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.28(1) (vest Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (vest 1987). But see CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-5 (vest 1986) (duties of Public Health Commissioner more detailed).
77. See, e.g., N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 2301 (McKinney 1985). For example, the court in State v. Snow, 230 Ark.
746, 324 S.W. 2d 532 (1959) was able to thwart a state effort to quarantine an individual for tuberculosis only because
initial judicial approval was required by the authorizing statute before enforcement could take place.
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statutes recognizing the importance of an impartial fact finder for an order of isolation
or quarantine do not provide procedural safeguards prior to the exercise of other
compulsory powers, such as mandatory physical examination, treatment, or contact
tracing. Several statutes originating in the 1940s identify specific categories of
individuals who may be required to undergo venereal disease examination by a public
health officer. 78 The applicable New Jersey statute, for example, presumes that a
prostitute "or other lewd person" may reasonably be suspected of having a venereal
disease and may therefore be subjected to examination at any time without a
hearing. 79
These statutory provisions survive only because they have yet to be challenged
in the courts. In contrast, mental health statutes before the 1970s which failed to
require rigorous due process procedures were found to violate the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 80 Since then, mental health cases have required notice
and a hearing before a judge and have established a right to counsel. 8t The standard
of proof constitutionally required at civil commitment hearings is more than a
preponderance of evidence; rather, it must demonstrate "clear and convincing
evidence. "82
Courts in the current process-oriented era of constitutional review would most
likely require procedural safeguards prior to or-in an emergency-immediately after
the exercise of personal control measures. In determining the kinds of procedures
required under the fourteenth amendment, the courts balance the interests of the state
with those of the individual. 83
The state's interest in protecting the public from serious harm is compelling. The
interest of the individual grows in proportion to the level of coerciveness of the public
health measure to be applied. When a control measure, such as isolation, infringes
upon liberty, the courts will likely require strict procedural due process safeguards in
light of the deep invasion of personal rights, the risk of erroneous fact-finding, and
the importance of avoiding confinement of nondangerous persons.
The West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned in Greene v. Edwards84 that there
is little difference between loss of liberty under mental health and public health
rationales. In each instance, the exercise of police power and the subsequent loss of
the individual's freedom are justified by the protection of the common good.
Prospective subjects of isolation or quarantine are therefore entitled to the same
procedural safeguards as persons facing civil commitment: written notice, counsel,
78. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:4-32 (West 1987) (applicable to prostitutes), id. § 26:4-49.6 (applicable to migrant
workers).
79. Id. § 26:4-32 (Vest 1987).
80. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F.
Supp. 424, 429-30 (D. Utah 1979); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Seefeld, 2 MmrrT.
DISABu.rrY L. REP. 363 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977) (sequel to Lessard in which the Wisconsin statute enacted in response to
Lessard was held unconstitutional).
81. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (inmate has liberty interest in preventing transfer from prison to
mental institution).
82. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) ("clear and convincing proof" may be required for
indefinite involuntary commitment).
83. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
84. 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980).
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presentation of evidence, cross examination, a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof, and a verbatim transcript for appeal.
The state need not, however, go so far as to provide the procedural safeguards
of a criminal trial. 85 Rather, the foregoing procedural requirements should be built
into public health statutes. Prior to or-in cases of urgent necessity-immediately
after the imposition of personal control measures, an impartial decision maker should
hear the case. This function belongs within the jurisdiction of the courts. The states
should bear the burden of providing a hearing, and the potential subject of control
measures should have the right to be represented by counsel to examine critically the
grounds and evidence upon which decisions are made. The individual should not be
left to discover after-the-fact remedies such as habeas corpus.
State legislatures should give careful thought to these procedural safeguards
designed to achieve both a more accurate fact-finding process and greater fairness to
the individual whose liberty is to be restrained. Procedural due process does not
merely protect the individual; it also ensures high quality decision making where a
complete and structured body of information is presented to a dispassionate decision
maker. Such hearings provide an opportunity for public health officials to review
their general strategy for controlling disease epidemics and to apply that strategy in
particular cases.
Society has yet to employ its legislature to delimit the circumstances under
which important public health decisions should be made. Because public health is one
of the very few reasons for which individual liberty can be restricted absent the
commission of a criminal offense, it is essential that legislatures guide officials to
understand clearly, and to apply fairly, decision making criteria and procedures.
B. Safe Environment for Isolation
Even if otherwise constitutional, the question arises whether isolation measures
may themselves be allowed to pose a health risk to their subjects. Although the court
in Kirk v. Board of Health86 was quite prepared to uphold an isolation scheme despite
the absence of proof that the form of leprosy from which Mary Kirk was suffering
was contagious, it nevertheless refused to subject her to an environment it considered
unsafe. Public health officials had planned to quarantine Kirk in a pesthouse, "a
structure of four small rooms in a row, with no piazzas, used heretofore for the
isolation of negroes with smallpox, situated within a hundred yards of the place where
the trash of the city ... is collected and burned." The court concluded that "even
temporary isolation in such a place would be a serious affliction and peril to an
elderly lady enfeebled by disease, and accustomed to the comforts of life." 8 7 The
public health department was compelled to delay isolating her until it had finished
building Kirk a "comfortable cottage" outside the city limits.
A more modern court, however, was less rigorous in reviewing the conditions
85. See id. at 662.
86. 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909).
87. Id., 65 S.E. at 391.
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of isolation. In Exparte Martin,88 a 1948 California case, county officials had elected
to isolate people with venereal disease in a jail, despite uncontested evidence that the
jail was overcrowded and had been condemned by a legislative investigating
committee. The court supported the attorney general's position that "[w]hile jails, as
public institutions, were established for purposes other than confinement of diseased
persons, occasions of emergency or lack of other public facilities for quarantine
require that jails be used.' '89
The use of the jail as a place of isolation and the absence of any rigorous
demonstration that the persons isolated were actually infected with venereal disease
imply that punishment was an underlying purpose in Martin. Punishment, however,
is not an appropriate public health goal. Public health departments have an obligation
not to do unnecessary harm, and that extends to avoiding unsafe or punitive
environments for subjects of an isolation. Indeed, those who must forego their
individual rights for the collective good should receive the best possible care and
conditions. While no recent case tests the issue of a safe environment for isolation;
the general trend towards insisting that health-law measures be rooted in medical
considerations strongly suggests that courts will reject any isolation scheme which,
like that in Martin, has punitive overtones.
The requirement to provide a safe and humane environment for isolation poses
special problems in the AIDS context. The two options are to provide separate
facilities or to integrate individuals in currently existing prisons, hospitals, mental
hospitals, or other health care or criminal justice facilities. Providing separate
facilities for infected persons sends a harmful message to the general public that the
state is establishing "AIDS colonies." This gives the wrong impression that AIDS is
transmitted from simple association with infected persons and that segregation from
other populations is desirable.
Segregated facilities must also be built or re-adapted, and adequately financed
and staffed. It would be difficult to recruit guards, health care and social workers, and
counselors to designated AIDS facilities. Segregated facilities must be clean,
sanitary, and otherwise provide a healthful, nonviolent environment. If, for example,
segregated individuals are exposed to violence, sexual advances, or drug use in the
facility, it could be harmful to their future health. Scientists do not entirely
understand the means by which a person progresses from HIV-positivity to
AIDS-related complex to AIDS. It is certainly possible that re-infection with the
AIDS virus will increase the progression from dormancy of the virus to serious
symptomology and death.
Use of integrated facilities would pose different problems. Residents and staff of
hospitals, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and even prisons often do not want to be
integrated with persons with HIV. This is particularly so if such individuals have been
selected because of their irresponsible behavior. Many will rightly argue that their
facilities have limited resources and training to deal with HIV infected patients.
88. 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287 (1948).
89. Id. at 170, 188 P.2d at 291 (quoting 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 146, 148).
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Furthermore, the facilities may argue that they were not designed or intended for this
purpose. Prison authorities believe they have insufficient medical and nursing re-
sources to treat terminally ill and infectious inmates; hospitals and nursing homes argue
that they should not have a social control role of confining aggressive persons; mental
hospitals argue that they cannot provide effective treatment for AIDS dementia.
If a policy of coercive action is socially beneficial, then government will engage
in effective planning and resource allocation to solve many of these significant
practical problems. However, given the antipathy of public health authorities toward
coercive action to control a disease epidemic, it is unlikely that any of these pragmatic
issues will be resolved. This places a large question mark over any program seeking
systematic application of criminal or civil sanctions for AIDS transmission.
C. Disease or Status-Based Isolation
A disease, or status-based, isolation would reach all those who test positive for
HIV or have CDC-defined AIDS. 90 Such an isolation would cause unimaginable
hardship, dislocation, and human, as well as social, cost. No state has seriously
proposed a general isolation, and it is highly unlikely to take place in the United
States. However, disease-based isolation has already occurred in Cuba9' and is a
seriously considered option in other countries.
Traditionally, the courts have been highly deferential to public health measures,
including isolation and quarantine. 92 However, it is widely agreed that a disease-
based isolation would most probably be held unconstitutional under modern
doctrine. 93
Isolation impacts on liberty and travel, rights which the Supreme Court has held
to be fundamental. 94 The Court would therefore evaluate an AIDS isolation statute
under strict scrutiny. While the Court's strict scrutiny analysis often signals its intent
to hold the measure unconstitutional, that need not always be the case. The Court
requires the state to have a compelling interest, 95 and to achieve that interest by
means which are narrowly tailored and minimally restrictive. 96 Impeding the spread
90. The eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment forbids criminal punishment for the status of
being ill. Robertson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). But the eighth amendment would not apply to isolation,
civil commitment, or preventive detention because they are regarded as regulatory, not punitive. See Sullivan & Field,
supra note I, at 146.
91. Betancourt, Cuba's Callous War on AIDS. N.Y. Times, Feb. It, 1988. at A35, col. 2. See S. FLusS, TABULAR
INFORMATION ON LEGAL I NSRUM.ENTs DEALING wrm AIDS AND HIV INFECTION, SPAIHLE/87. I (Available from WHO,
Geneva).
92. See Burnis. Fear Itself. AIDS. Herpes, and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 479 (1985);
Curran. Clark & Gostin, supra note 71. at 32; Gostin, The Future of Communicable Disease Control: Toward a New
Concept in Public Health Law. 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. (Supp. 1) 79, 85-88 (1986) [hereinafter Gostin, Future
Communicable Disease]; Gostin, supra note 64, at 464-68, Merritt, supra note 73, at 776-83; Parmet. supra note 64.
93. Gostin, supra note 64, at 468-71: Merritt, supra note 73 at 778-83; Parmet, supra note 73; Sullivan & Field,
supra note I. at 146-52; Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers. 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1281-84 (1986).
94. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418. 425 (1979) (standard of proof for civil commitment for the mentally ill);
Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618. 629-30 (1969) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
95. See Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214. 218 (1944) (only the gravest imminent danger to public safety
can justify forced removal from one's home).
96. See Note, Developments it the Law-Equal Protection. 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1084-86 (1969).
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of AIDS is certainly a state interest which is sufficiently strong to survive heightened
judicial scrutiny. 97
But a status-based isolation would be substantially overinclusive. It would
indiscriminately sweep in its wake not only those who spread the disease, but also
many who do not. Screening of low-risk populations can generate significant
numbers of false positives 9 8-i.e., persons who test positive but who do not harbor
the virus. In addition, some individuals who do harbor the virus are no longer
infectious because the virus has eliminated its host cells. 99 Even for those who are
truly infectious, the great majority will not be dangerous. Some are children. Some
are involved in monogamous relationships, and would inform their partners and use
barrier protection against the exchange of body fluids. Still others are too debilitated
or demoralized to engage in any high risk activity. To assume that all persons who test
positive for HIV antibodies are dangerous, and to confine them, potentially for life,
would be a substantially overbroad policy.
Status-based isolation could also be substantially underinclusive. In order to
reach everyone capable of transmitting the AIDS virus, public health authorities
would have to test the entire population periodically.100 This would be such a costly
policy that politicians would more narrowly draw the boundaries of coercive action.
These boundaries might be based on having CDC-defined AIDS, or on membership
in a high risk group. Targeting persons with AIDS or in high risk groups for special
treatment would exclude growing numbers of people with infection who are
heterosexual, blood transfusion recipients, hemophiliacs, and others.101
The courts do not always view underinclusiveness as a serious constitutional
flaw. 102 Nothing prevents a state from devising a public health solution which is only
partially effective. But sometimes the courts find that underinclusiveness is so
arbitrary as to deny equal protection. 0 3 As one commentator observes, underinclu-
siveness casts doubt on the sincerity of the public objective: "Where a quarantine is
mapped out along the boundaries of a group that is independently the object of fear,
prejudice and hatred, there is reason for skepticism."0 4 The fact that status-based
isolation would impact exclusively or disproportionately on IV drug users, gays, and
97. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
98. The ELISA test for HIV antibodies produces false positive results ranging from 1/3 to 213 of all cases in a low
risk population. This figure can be substantially reduced with confirmatory testing. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg,
Screeningfor HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits and the Burden of Proof, 14 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259,262-63 (1986);
Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, Compulsory Premarital Screening for the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus: Technical and Public Health Considerations, 258 J. A.M.A. 1757, 1758 (1987); Gostin, Curran & Clark, supra
note 12, at 11-13.
99. Leeson, HTLV-Il Antibody Tests and Health Education, 1 LANcEr 911 (1986).
100. Since so many persons infected with HIV and capable of transmitting the virus are symptomless, the only
systematic method of identifying them would be widespread population screening. This would be a highly costly and
fruitless public health intervention. See Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, supra note 98, at 1761; Gostin,
Screening for AIDS: Efficacy, Cost and Consequences, 2 AIDS AND PUB. PoLIcY J. 14 (1987); Gostin, Curran & Clark,
supra note 12, at 19-24.
101. See Review of Current Knowledge, supra note 3.
102. See Note, supra note 96, at 1065, 1084-86.
103. Id.
104. Sullivan & Field, supra note 1, at 149.
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racial minorities'0 5 who are independently disfavored communities calls into question
whether the true reason for this isolation is public health at all. The suspicion would
persist whether the same policy of deprivation of liberty on a massive scale would be
applied to more favored social groups.10 6
There are numerous public policy reasons against a disease-based isolation
which can be added to the constitutional arguments. These policy reasons flow from
the unique combination of scientific findings relating to HIV. First, the sheer number
of people capable of transmitting the virus, estimated at up to 1.4 million and
growing,10 7 would make a general isolation prohibitively expensive and wholly
unmanageable. Huge practical problems would arise in identifying infected persons
with initial and confirmatory tests, and then housing and caring for them, all at public
expense. Second, retroviruses like HIV usually live in the carrier for life. There is no
finite incubation period, so carriers of the virus are presumed chronically
infectious.t 0 8 Confinement of carriers, if it is to be truly effective, must be indefinite.
A program of confinement of a person with HIV, therefore, must count on the fact
that it can be potentially life-long. Such extensive restriction of personal liberty for
behaviors which are part of the human biological function appear excessive. Third,
there is no preventive or curative treatment for HIV infection. Those whose liberty is
infringed, therefore, would have no way to restore themselves to normal conditions
in order to re-join the community. Finally, because casual contact does not spread the
virus, segregation from society is unnecessary and, by definition, overly restrictive.
Taken together, these factors set AIDS apart from other communicable diseases that
have been the subject of traditional personal control measures and make status-based
isolation a singularly inappropriate policy.
105. The cumulative incidence of AIDS cases is disproportionately high among blacks (3.0 to 1) and Hispanics (2.6
to 1) compared with whites. When homosexual and bisexual men with AIDS are excluded, the ratio of AIDS case
incidence is 12.0 to 1 for blacks, and 9.3 to 1 for Hispanics as compared with whites. Review of Current Knowledge,
supra note 3, at 36. The reasons for this recurring racial disproportion of infection, whether behavioral or biological, are
not yet apparent. The higher rate of IV drug use among black and Hispanic groups may be a factor, but there remains a
racial disproportion even among IV drug users. See Greaves, The Black Community, in AIDS AND THE LAw: A GUIDE FOR
TE PUBLIc 281-82 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987); Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Among Blacks and
Hispanics-United States, 35 MoReeDrry & MoRTALrrY VEEKLY REP. 655, 666 (1986).
106. There are several significant reasons why a court might not find under-inclusion unconstitutional in the AIDS
context. The argument that isolation denied equal protection of the laws to gays or IV drug users falters on the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence refusing to find either group to be a suspect class. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
the Supreme Court held that the states could constitutionally criminalize sodomy. The Court found no privacy interest in
homosexual relations and no reason to use heightened scrutiny because of the traditionally disfavored status of gays. For
strong arguments in favor of making homosexuality a suspect classification, see Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985); Note, An Argument for the
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. Rev. 797
(1984). In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazel, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) the Court upheld a transit authority decision
to exclude methadone users from employment. The Court found no reason to find drug users as a suspect class despite
the fact that they are often poor and black or Hispanic. Finally, the Supreme Court has been loath to find that
disproportional representation of minority groups is a reason for special scrutiny. So long as the class is not drawn on
racial lines the court has looked the other way despite overwhelming evidence of disproportionate impact on minorities.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (upholding death penalty despite the fact that it was used in many more
cases of black offenders).
107. See supra note 3.
108. See Curran & Morgan, supra note 5, at 1354; Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectivity and
Mechanisms of Pathogenesis, 239 SctENcE 617, 621 (1988).
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D. Modified Isolation Based upon Behavior, not Disease Status
The terms "incorrigible" and "recalcitrant" have been used to refer to persons
who are aware that they have been exposed to the AIDS virus, yet continue to engage
in high-risk activities that expose others to the disease, despite warnings by doctors
and health officials to modify their behavior. Numerous cases have been publicized
of individuals brazenly announcing their intentions to continue to infect others
through prostitution, sexual intercourse, needle sharing, or donating blood. 0 9 Those
who engage in such seriously dangerous behavior are often well aware of the
consequences of that behavior, and can be predicted to continue it. These people are
widely regarded as blameworthy. If confinement is the only way to prevent an
unmistakable risk to the public, then no one could reasonably deny the state's right
to intervene.
The rationale for behavior-based isolation is a mix of prevention and retribution.
Like traditional isolation, it is designed to be forward-looking in preventing future
disease transmission. But its reliance upon past dangerous behavior has an element of
retribution similar to that found in the criminal law. Apart from its purported
objective of slowing the spread of AIDS, behavior-based isolation offers society an
outlet for its frustration and anger towards AIDS carriers by restricting the liberty of
a few individuals who are visibly evil and worthy of condemnation for fueling the
epidemic. In truth, as we shall see, it will have very little positive effect on the
epidemic.
Recognizing the practical and legal problems with general isolation, state
authorities have begun to revise their isolation proposals to encompass only
incorrigible cases. This is politically much easier because it is far less expensive, and
targets only individuals who are universally seen as culpable.
While general isolation measures would be deemed unconstitutional by the
courts, most commentators agree that a narrowly drawn behavior-based isolation
would probably be upheld."t0 Modified isolation, unlike general isolation, does not
focus on a person's health status, but upon his or her behavior. It is aimed at a small
number of individuals rather than a sizeable class of persons united by a common
characteristic. It is difficult to envisage a court striking down a well-focused public
health measure, when there is clear evidence available that an individual is likely to
engage in behavior leading to transmission of a potentially lethal virus.
The courts have consistently upheld civil confinement of persons shown to be
dangerous in the public health"' and mental health"12 contexts. Such statutes, while
109. Stephanie Smith, for example, was shunned by her drug treatment facility when it discovered she was HIV
positive. She dropped out of treatment. She told public health officials that she was sharing her needles without cleaning
them and engaging in prostitution without taking precautions or informing her clients. Lewin, supra note 1. See Squires,
supra note I; Boorstin, supra note I.
110. See Sullivan & Field, supra note I, at 152-56; Merritt, supra note 71; Parmet, supra note 64; Gostin, Future
Communicable Disease, supra note 92, at 91-95. But see Note, supra note 93.
111. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 261 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980); State ex rel. Kennedy v. Head, 182 Tenn. 249,
185 S.W.2d 530 (1945); In re Caselli, 62 Mont. 201, 204 P. 364 (1922); Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y. 493, 116 N.E.
355 (N.Y. 1917), aff'd 147 N.Y.S. 1105; Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909); Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich.
238, 60 N.W. 440 (1894). See also, Merritt, supra note 73, at 776-78.
112. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563 (1975).
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attracting heightened scrutiny, would achieve a powerful state interest in a way which
focuses only on the dangerous and not on those unlikely to engage in high-risk
behavior. The dangerous acts, moreover, are often criminal in themselves-
prostitution, sodomy, or drug use.
Even if courts were to uphold limited behavior-based isolation, distinct public
policy reasons make them weak candidates for implementation. Behavior-based
isolation suffers from some of the same defects as does general isolation. If the target
is unable to alter his or her behavior, modified isolation is likely to mean permanent
confinement. Further, isolation is far more intrusive and restrictive than would be the
provision of drug treatment (where appropriate), physiological or medical treatment,
counseling, or economic assistance designed to alleviate or alter the conditions that
lead to "incorrigible" behavior.
The objective of isolation is to prevent future risky behavior. It may do so in
individual cases, but will probably have an overall adverse impact on the wider high
risk populations. Isolation statutes would discourage members of high risk groups
from seeking testing or treatment, or speaking honestly to counselors concerning their
behavioral intentions. If the certain legal consequence of a person confiding his future
intentions is loss of liberty, then individuals would avoid contact with health care
professionals and public health programs. The cost, therefore, of preventing a few
cases of HIV transmission through isolation may be to undermine public health
efforts for broad population changes in behavior. While the objective is to impede the
spread of HIV, coercive measures could drive the epidemic underground, thereby
defeating the purpose..
Objective statutory and psychological criteria are inadequate to determine
accurately enough who is "recalcitrant" or to predict behavior. Even for those who
are mentally ill, psychiatrists are still unable to predict dangerous behavior with
anything better than random accuracy. 1 13 There is no reason to believe that behavioral
scientists could predict future behavior in the public health context any better. In
other words, individuals who declared an intention to engage in high-risk behavior
could not be reliably distinguished from those who forswore unsafe conduct.
Those who come to the attention of public officials as candidates for isolation are
a small fraction of the total infected population. This small part of the total at-risk
population is likely to be the poorest, least articulate of those harboring the virus.
Such a skewed "lottery" would have a negligible impact on the spread of the disease
because the vast majority of instances of transmissions would continue to go
unnoticed. While isolation would lead to the impression that the state was "getting
tough" on AIDS transmission, in reality it would not scratch the surface of the
epidemic.
This may well lead authorities to widen the net of those subject to behavior-
113. See, e.g., E. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVioR: AN ASSESSME.N OF CUNICAL TECHNIQUES (1981). In
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court upheld the death penalty based upon a psychiatric prediction of
dangerousness. This provoked Justice Blackmun to observe in dissent, based upon an amicus brief from the American
Psychiatric Association, that predictions of dangerousness are wrong "two out of three" times. Id. at 920. "In the present
state of psychiatric knowledge this is too much for me." Id.
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based isolation. Public health authorities may seek to sweep in HIV-infected persons
attending bathhouses or gay bars, prostitutes, and IV drug users attending shooting
galleries. Large numbers of.unpopular individuals are perceived, but not proved, to
be dangerous. If a public place such as a bathhouse is demonstrated to be a public
health hazard, the state can exercise its regulatory power to closely supervise its
activities or close it down. But a decision to confine all those who attend such
facilities would be overly restrictive and prejudicial to the nondangerous.
State intervention to prevent seriously dangerous behavior of "incorrigibles"
through isolation measures appears justified. However, the policy would be ineffec-
tive, perhaps counterproductive, in controlling the AIDS epidemic, and may easily
include a wider net of nondangerous persons. Below, I explore the efficacy and fairness
of using a retributive criminal law model to deal with a public health problem.
IV. CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV TRANsMIsSION
There is a powerful appeal in using the criminal law as a method of containing
the spread of AIDS. The criminal law is well used to sanctioning blameworthy
individuals for their dangerous acts. The justification of the criminal law is commonly
understood to be retribution for past behavior. Yet, one of the principal objectives of
the criminal law is the prevention of future acts. By establishing explicit penalties, the
criminal law seeks to deter individuals from engaging in certain clearly specified
behavior. The transmission of a potentially lethal infection with forethought or
recklessness is just as dangerous as other behavior the criminal law already
proscribes. It is not unreasonable for society to establish clear parameters as to the
behaviors it will not tolerate. By drawing a bright line around the behaviors that pose
serious public health risks, the law gives clear notice of the conduct which will be
subject to criminal penalty.
This approach can hardly be considered unfair to those individuals in high-risk
groups for AIDS because it protects these groups against the spread of infection. Nor
can it be considered unfair to the few whose behavior subjects them to criminal
penalties, for it is better to give clear forewarning of unacceptable conduct rather than
to confine a person who might engage in that behavior in the future.
The criminal law has many advantages over the personal control measure most
likely to survive judicial scrutiny-behavior-based isolation. Whereas isolation
statutes employ such general terms as "incorrigibility" and "recalcitrance,"
criminal statutes must specify the behavior that is prohibited. If its language is vague,
a criminal statute fails to forewarn, and is for that reason unconstitutional. Whereas
isolation statutes arise from predictions about the future, criminal statutes focus on
behavior that has already occurred. Whereas "incorrigibility" and "recalcitrance"
need only be proved by clear and convincing evidence, each element of a crime must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whereas the period of isolation is usually
indefinite, the period of criminal confinement is usually finite and proportionate to
the gravity of the offense. As a deterrent, the period of confinement should not last
longer than necessary to discourage future reckless behavior, both by the person
detained and by others who take note of his or her plight. The longer the period of
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confinement, the more it smacks of retribution, a goal inconsistent with the mission
of public health authorities.
There is an attraction based upon clarity, objectivity, and sufficient safeguards
which makes the criminal law a good candidate for public health consideration. This
attraction of the criminal law has not escaped policy makers. The Presidential Com-
mission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic noted that "[e]xtending
criminal liability to those who knowingly engage in behavior which is likely to transmit
HIV is consistent with society's obligation to prevent harm to others and the criminal
law's concern with punishing those whose behavior results in harmful acts.""114
The Presidential Commission report has been published in a political climate
which has already heavily utilized the general criminal law in combatting the spread
of AIDS. A conservative estimate is that there have been fifty to one hundred criminal
cases brought relating to HIV transmission, which vary greatly in gravity."t5
First, many cases have been brought against individuals who knew they were
infected with HIV and had sexual intercourse without informing their partner. Several
114. REPORTOrFTHEPRESIDENUIALCOMMISSION ON THE HMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRuS EPIDFMC 130-31 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Off., June 24, 1988) [hereinafter PREsIoEtAL CO.ItM'N REP.]. The Commission does not favor use of the general
criminal law, but adoption of an AIDS-specific criminal statute. See infra notes 115-34 and accompanying text. The
Presidential Commission was established under Exec. Order No. 12,601, 3 C.F.R. 238 (1987), amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,603, 3 C.F.R. 238 (1987). The American Medical Association and the Institute of Medicare have also
recommended the rare use of coercive powers. American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 J. A.M.A. 1360, 1361 (1988) [hereinafter A.M.A. Council]
(recommendation 17-given the risk of infection being transmitted sexually, and given the dire potential consequences
of transmission, serious consideration should be given to sanctions for past dangerous sexual acts); UPDATE 1988, supra
note 3, at 83 (the use of the criminal law will not address the core problems, but in "rare instances" the state should
restrict personal liberties).
115. See, W. CutAN, L. GosrIN, & M. Ct.,, supra note 68, at 344-48 (in which are discussed People v.
Richards, 85-1715 FG, where HIV- infected person charged in Flint, Michigan with assault and intent to commit murder
after he spat on four police officers; People v. Prairie Chicken, CRE-77357, where person suspected of having AIDS in
El Cajon, California pleaded guilty to a felonious assault for biting an officer, People v. Julius, 761210, where a person
suspected of carrying HIV pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor assault in San Francisco after prosecutor abandoned plans to
file felony charges over another police biting incident); Lacayoh, Assault with a Deadly Virus, TiME, July 20, 1987, at
63 (reporting several cases of criminal charges relating to AIDS transmission); New Charges Possible in AIDS Assault
Case, U.S. Med., June 1987, at 8 (Pfc. Jane Doe charged with having sex without informing her partner that she was HIV
infected); Squires, supra note I (citing numerous cases of courts martial or criminal charges brought against HIV-infected
individuals for sexual relationships or biting); Soldier with AIDS Virus to be Imprisoned for Sexual Contacts, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1987, at B5, col. 1 (first conviction); Medical Specialist Faces AIDS Related Court-Martial, Am. Med. News,
Oct. 16, 1987, at 12 (case against Sgt. Richard W. Sargeant, similar to Pfc. Morris); eisehaus, AIDS Criminal Laws,
Cases Rise, Nat'l L.J., July 20, 1987, at 3, col. I (Minnesota prisoner convicted of assault with a deadly weapon for biting
a guard. The conviction was upheld in United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987)); Cummings, Charges
Filed Against Blood Donor in AIDS Case, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1987, at A18, col. 1 (Joseph Markowski was charged
with attempted murder for selling his blood to a private collection center; later the charges were dropped for lack of
evidence. Pristin, Charges of Attempted Murder Voided in Case of AIDS-Tainted Blood, L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 1987 Part
II (Metro), at 1, col. 1); Deadly Weapon in AIDS Verdict is Inmate's Teeth, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1987, at A18, col.6;
Boorstin, supra note I (citing 30 cases being filed); HIV Positive Private Charged with Assault, Am. Med. News, May
22129, 1987, at I (case of Army Pfc. Adrian Morris, Jr., who faced a court-martial for sexual relationships while infected
with HIV); Testimony of Major Paul A. Capofari, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army,
Pentagon, to Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, Interstate Commerce
Commission Bldg. Hearing Room B, April 6, 1988 (reporting several more cases of HIV infected soldiers facing courts-
martial).
The only reported criminal case outside of the United States occurred in the case of Linwood B., an employee of a
U.S. Military Base in Nuremberg, Vest Germany. The man is a private U.S. citizen who was convicted by a Bavarian
Court for sexual intercourse, knowing he had HIV. See E. Drucker, The Case of Linwood B., Preliminary Report to
Medicins du Monde, Paris, France (Unpublished December 25, 1987) (on file at the Ohio State Law Journal);
Schmemann, Bavarian Court Convicts American in AIDS Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at AS, col. 1.
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of these cases have involved military personnel. The Department of Defense orders
HIV-infected personnel to refrain from unprotected sex and to inform their partners
of their condition. Violation of a "safe sex" order can result in charges ranging from
disobeying a military order to assault with a dangerous weapon and attempted
murder. ' 16
Second, criminal charges have been brought in connection with biting, spitting,
kicking, or splattering of blood by an HIV-infected person.'" 7 In United States v.
Moore"t8 a federal district court upheld the conviction of a prisoner for "assault with
a deadly or dangerous weapon" for biting two federal corrections officers. The
"weapon" was HIV. In State v. Haines,It9 an Indiana Superior Court judge
sentenced a person with AIDS-related complex to six years imprisonment after he
was convicted by a jury on three counts of attempted murder of a police officer and
emergency technicians for splattering his blood at them. 20
Finally, cases have been brought for knowingly donating or selling blood
contaminated with HIV. The most celebrated of these cases was Joseph Markowski
who was charged with attempted murder for selling his HIV-infected blood to a Los
Angeles blood company.' 2' The charges were subsequently dropped for lack of
evidence on intent to murder, 22 but legislators have since developed an interest in
specifically criminalizing such activity.' 23
These cases point out the inadequacy of applying a general criminal law theory
116. The military distinguishes between married and unmarried personnel. The spouses of married personnel are
officially informed of the serological status of their spouse. A married couple then is permitted to have unprotected sex.
The military will not inform a nonmarried sexual partner. But it has implemented a regulation effective April 1, 1988,
requiring a commander to discuss a written counseling statement with any soldier who has tested positive and has received
medical counseling. The form says that the commander is "imposing the following restrictions: 'You will verbally advise
all prospective sexual partners of your diagnosed condition prior to engaging in any sexual intercourse. You are also
ordered to use condoms should you engage in sexual intercourse with a partner .... [Failure] to adhere to your previous
medical counseling or the counseling I have just given you will subject you to administrative separation and/or punishment
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as I see fit."' See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1988, at A19, col. I; See also
Squires, supra note 1; Turner, The Military Battles a New "Biological" Weapon: AIDS, Nat'l L.J., May 11, 1987, at 6,
col. 1. The first military conviction resulted from a guilty plea in a court-martial to adultery, sodomy, and disobeying an
officer by Sergeant Richard W. Sargeant; Testimony of Major Paul A. Capofari, supra note 115; Soldier with AIDS Virus
to Be Imprisoned for Sexual Contacts, N.Y. Times, supra note 115. A guilty plea for aggravated assault and absence from
the post in a similar case resulted in two years imprisonment. Army Sergeant Pleads Guilty of Infecting a G.L. with AIDS,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at B25, col I.
117. See, e.g., Squires, supra note 1; Boorstin, supra note 1.
118. 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987).
119. Cause No. S-5585 (Super. Ct., Tippecanoe County, Indiana 1987 Term).
120. Id. See Gostin, AIDS and Safety, Boston Globe, Feb. 22, 1988, at 19, col. 4 (Letter to the Editor); Gostin,
Emgergency Workers and AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 10, col. 2 (Letter to the Editor).
121. Cummings, supra note 115. See Gostin, Criminal Law Won't Stop AIDS, L.A. Times, July 6, 1987, Part II,
at 5, col. 3.
122. Pristin, stpra note 115.
123. A Bill by Senator Jesse Helms, for example, would make it a crime to donate blood, semen, or organs by
anyone who is HIV positive or is a member of a high risk group. S.1352, 100th Cong. 1st Sess., 133 CoNo. REc.
S7989-91 (1987). Up to 1.4 million people are estimated to be silently harboring the virus, and many more are in high
risk groups. See supra note 3. The great majority of these individuals are of sexually active age. An unknown number
of these individuals will either know, or reasonably should know, they are at risk for HIV. NVe can conservatively assume
that there will be hundreds of thousands of incidents each year where these individuals will engage in sexual relations or
needle sharing. Should all of these incidents be defined as unlawful and subject to societal retribution? what moral or
public health differences are there between the so-called "recalcitrant" prostitute or drug abuser and the rest of the many
thousands who will silently engage in the same kind of behavior?
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to an infectious disease. In the overwhelming majority of cases the prosecutions were
dropped or individuals were acquitted. In none of these cases was there evidence that
HIV had actually been transmitted. The general criminal law has sought to punish risk
taking, sometimes of a very low level.
Partly in frustration with the difficulty in obtaining convictions under the general
criminal law, policy makers have sought other avenues to criminalize the risk of
AIDS transmission such as creating public health or AIDS-specific offenses.
Approximately half the states have public health laws which designate engaging in
sexual intercourse while knowingly infected with a sexually transmitted disease as a
public health offense.' 2 4 These public health statutes were created to control the
spread of syphilis and gonorrhea. Most of these statutes, however, do not apply to
HIV because AIDS is not usually classified as a sexually transmitted disease.125 In
response to this perceived "gap" in the law, some state legislators are moving toward
re-classifying AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease. 126
Several states have enacted AIDS-specific statutes. 27 These statutes are based
on the model of older public health offenses, except that they apply solely to HIV
transmission. These AIDS-specific statutes differ in scope, but all make it an offense
for a person to knowingly engage in some type of behavior which poses a risk of
transmission of HIV-sexual intercourse, needle sharing, donating blood, or, more
broadly, attempting to transfer any "body fluid." The elegance of such statutes from
the prosecutor's perspective is usually there is no need to prove any specific intent.
The elements of the crime are usually straightforward: the person knew he was
infected with HIV, engaged in well-defined, risky behavior, and failed to inform his
partner of the risk.
The haste to criminalize the risk of AIDS transmission ignores the failure of
previous attempts to control venereal disease, 28 as well as the considerable
jurisprudential and public health problems that would arise. Below I enumerate those
124. Gostin, supra note 64, at 477; Sullivan & Field, supra note I, at 170.
125. W. CuRmAN, L. GosnN & M. CLARK, supra note 68. A few public health statutes are not solely applicable to
venereal diseases but cover any act where the person knowingly transmits a communicable disease. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21 § 1192 (\Vest 1983); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
126. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.25(2) (West Supp. 1988).
127. See, e.g., FI". STAT. ANN. §§ 384.24, .34(1) (West Supp. 1988) (criminal offense for person with HIV to
knowingly have sexual intercourse with another person, unless he first informs that person); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp.
1988) (makes it a felony for any person to expose another with intent to infect or knowing he has HIV, including sexual
or shared needle transmission as well as donative gifts); 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv., extraordinary session 663 H.B. no.
1728 (Vest) (criminalizes intentional, sexual transmission of HIV without partner's informed consent); 1988 Wash.
Legis. Serv. 206 S.B. 6221 (West Supp.) (a person who with intent to inflict bodily harm or "causes to be taken" by
another HIV or exposes or transmits HIV is guilty of assault). There are many other bills which have been proposed which
would create AIDS-specific offenses. See also H. R. 345, 100th Cong. 1 st Sess. (1987) (would make it a crime if a federal
employee with HIV knowingly or recklessly attempts to transfer any of his body fluids).
128. Experience with these public health offenses shows that the laws are now very rarely enforced. When they have
been enforced on a wide scale, there has been no perceptible impact on the rate of transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases. See Brandt, supra note 11, at 239; Merritt, supra note 71. The most extensive use of coercive powers have often
been against vulnerable and visible populations such as prostitutes. See, e.g., HIV Tests Ordered for Prostitutes, Their
Clients, 31 Med. News 39 (Feb. 12, 1988). Indeed, some public health statutes now specifically target this population.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.08(4) (Vest Supp. 1988) (any person who commits prostitution knowing that she or he has a
sexually transmitted disease is guilty of an offense); NEv. Rsv. STAT. ANN., 1987 Cum. Supp. (Michie, 1987) tit. 15,
chap. 201, § 201.443 (any licensed prostitute who practices with knowledge of a positive HIV test result is guilty of a
felony).
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problems in relation to general criminal law theory and AIDS-specific criminal
statutes.
A. General Criminal Law Theory
Acts which pose a risk of HIV transmission have resulted in criminal charges
ranging from simple or aggravated assault to attempted homicide or homicide. 129 The
objective of this section is to demonstrate the difficulty of proving that a crime has
been committed under general criminal law theory; and, where it can be proved, to
show that often it achieves no important public purpose.
Depending upon the charge, there are three possible mental states required to
prove an offense. The HIV-infected person can be accused of an act of transmission
which is intentional, knowing, or reckless. 130
1. Intentional or Knowing Transmission
A person acts purposefully if his conscious objective is to cause a harmful result
such as death.131 The Model Penal Code uses a subjective standard for criminal
attempts so that if the facts were as the person believes them to be, it is an offense. 132
This is important in the AIDS context because a person could be convicted of
attempted murder if his intent is to kill, regardless of whether or not the method used
poses a real risk of viral transmission. 133 For example, if a person spits at an enemy
intending to kill him by transmitting AIDS, he has in theory committed attempted
murder.
If an HIV-infected person plans to kill out of a motive such as revenge or greed,
and uses a means which has some reasonably significant chance of killing such as
sexual contact or needle sharing, that person should bear full responsibility under the
criminal law. Yet, it would be unfair and contrary to public policy to punish acts
which a person falsely believes to be dangerous. This is tantamount to punishing evil
beliefs, while the law should be concerned with punishing and preventing truly
dangerous acts. The criminal law achieves no valid purpose by punishing the
nondangerous. 134
129. It would be highly unlikely for a homicide or manslaughter charge to be relevant because the victim must
already have died. There is a period of five years or longer from the time HIV is contracted to development of serious
symptomology. See Fauci, supra note 108, at 621. In most cases the person accused would have pre-deceased the victim.
130. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1980) (defining murder as the killing of a human being purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."). For a
perceptive discussion of the application of the Model Penal Code to HIV transmission, see Sullivan & Field, supra note
1, at 162-69.
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1980) (defining a purposeful act).
132. Id. at § 5.01(1)(a).
133. Impossibility or low likelihood is not a defense to an attempted murder charge. See, e.g., Rex v. White [1910]
2 K.B. 124 (C.A.) (low dose of poison insufficient to cause death resulted in conviction for attempted murder). The reason
such cases are attempted murder is that, according to Justice Holmes, they address "an evil which threatens death,
according to common apprehension." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897). See also
E. MEsnAN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL TraMPr-A TREATIsE 165-66 (1984). Compare such low dose poison cases with an
HIV-infected person who enters into a long sexual relationship, intending to kill. While a single sexual encounter has a
low chance of viral transmission, a longer relationship raises the probabilities considerably.
134. There is strong legal support for this conclusion in a number of jurisdictions which employ a "dangerousness
test"-viz, acts which are "directly dangerous" to society, or any interest protected by the criminal law, should be an
THE POLITICS OF AIDS
Irrespective of the dangerousness of an act, intentionality is exceedingly difficult
to prove. One commentator illustrates the rarity of such cases by observing that
"[h]aving sex or sharing needles is a highly indirect modus operandi for the person
whose purpose is to kill."' 35
"Knowing" transmission of HIV is also difficult to prove. A person acts
knowingly if he is aware or is "practically certain" that his conduct will cause harm
or death.' 36 In the AIDS context, the person must have tested positive for HIV and
must know that the particular act would almost certainly transmit the virus.
Knowledge of seropositivity, however, is difficult to prove because many individuals
are tested anonomously at "alternative test sites," or decline to be tested at all. In the
event that such knowledge can be proved, the prosecution must show further that the
person understood the conduct was an almost certain method of viral transmission.
But epidemiological studies have demonstrated very low probabilities of HIV
transmission in a single incident. The press, moreover, has given contradictory
messages about the communicability of HIV. Some reports, for example, have
minimized the risk of heterosexual transmission, 137 while others have emphasized
it.138 Given these ambiguities, it is doubtful that the prosecution could show that the
defendant "knew" his conduct would be infectious.
Charges of attempted murder have been brought in cases where it is barely
conceivable that any "purposeful" or "knowing" state of mind could reasonably be
established.139 Such cases often reflect either a politically motivated eagerness to be
seen to be combatting AIDS or a misunderstanding of how it is transmitted.
Unfortunately, many juries will labor under the same misapprehensions or have the
same kinds of prejudices against groups most vulnerable to HIV. 140
a. Sexual Intercourse
Numerous cases have been brought against HIV-infected persons for knowingly
or intentionally seeking to harm his or her partner through sexual intercourse. 141
People enter sexual relationships with many different intentions, passions, desires,
attempted offense. See Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. RaV. 835, 845 (1928). Ibis is also referred to as the
"dangerous proximity" test. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912). Justice Holmes explained the rationale
by stating that public policy is at the "bottom of the matter; the considerations ... being the nearness of the danger, the
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt." 0. Houtis, THE CO.wttON LAW 68 (1881).
135. Sullivan & Field, supra note 1, at 163.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(B)(H) (1980). "Knowledge is established if a person is aware of a 'high
probability' of a particular fact." Id. § 2.02(7).
137. Gould, Reassuring News About AIDS: A Dr. Tells Why You May Not Be At Risk, Cosmopolitan Magazine,
Jan. 1988, at 146.
138. W. MAsrEm, E. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, CRISIS: HETERosEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS (1988).
139. See supra notes 115-123, and infra notes 140, 147-151 and accompanying text.
140. In the Haines case, for example, the jury took barely two hours to convict the defendant of attempted murder
on all three counts, despite the paucity of any evidence that he intended to kill a police officer and emergency technicians.
Mr. Haines had never seen his victims before. They found him unconscious, face down in a pool of blood after a serious
suicide attempt. When he was revived by the emergency workers, his first words were "let me die, I have AIDS." A
superior court judge in Lafayette, Indiana substituted a conviction for battery in place of the jury's finding of attempted
murder. Mr. Haines was sentenced to six years imprisonment. State v. Haines, No. S-5585 (Super. Ct., Tippecanoe
County, Indiana 1987 Term). See also supra note 120 and infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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and fears. Causing harm through sexuality is seldom consciously planned. Often the
relationship involves love, affection, or passion, where neither partner wants to harm
the other, but is willing to take risks. In order to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
what the person knew or intended, it is often necessary to discuss what went on and
what was said, in the privacy of a sexual encounter. That encounter may have taken
place years ago, or it may be part of an ongoing relationship where much was
discussed. Did the person know he harbored the virus? Did he inform his sexual
partner? Did they engage in protected sexual intercourse? Did the partner assume the
risk of HIV transmission in many other sexual encounters or IV drug experiences?
Such issues as consent or assumption of risk may not be defenses to a charge of
attempted homicide. But all these questions can be probative in establishing whether
the person's intention was in fact to kill. A person whose purpose is homicide is
unlikely to inform a consenting partner of the risk or to use barrier protection.
The criminal law is ill suited to deal with intimate sexual relationships.
Transmission of a virus does not fit neatly into the model of a guilty offender and an
innocent victim. Both parties engaged in a relationship can, and are advised to, take
precautions to avoid exchange of body fluids. It is usually problematic to allocate
blame to one of the partners. For example, many targets of criminal prosecutions are
prostitutes, 142 who often try to use barrier protection despite client objections. If a
man seeks out and pays a prostitute, and refuses to use protection, is the woman the
only culpable party? Yet, in most such cases, only the prostitute is charged with a
serious criminal offense. 143
Sexual intercourse is a primary mode of transmission of HIV. A knowing
decision by an HIV-infected person to endanger an unsuspecting partner is blame-
worthy. But balanced against this undoubted fact is the relatively low likelihood of
HIV transmission in a single incident (estimated at 1/1,000 or 1/10,000 if a condom
is used appropriately). 144
Serious criminal sanctions to prevent relatively low risks may not be worth the
costs. Attempts to criminalize sexual behavior are notoriously problematic. Sexuality
and prostitution are highly complex human and biological behaviors which are
resistant to change. Sexual intercourse is an integral part of human gratification and
reproduction. Prostitution is a profession which has resisted societal efforts to
prohibit it for millennia.
The criminal law, moreover, does not simply require high-risk groups to change
a single act for a specific period of time. They are required to alter their behavior over
142. See generally A. BRANDT, supra note 11.
143. In an analagous case at Fort Sam Houston in Texas, an Army serviceman tested positive for HIV and was
ordered by his company commander to inform his sexual partners of the test results and to take precautions. According
to the charges against him, he continued dating and having sexual relations with three people. He confessed to his
commander that while he took precautions to protect his sexual partners, he never informed them of his HIV status.
Squires, supra note 1.
144. See Boorstin, supra note I; supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Compare the relatively low risk of
sexual intercourse with the much more significant risk of an HIV-infected mother having a seropositive baby. Here the
risk is approximately 50% or greater. Yet, the criminal law would not establish a penalty on the mother for conceiving
and failing to abort.
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a lifetime. We already know from other health-related behavior such as smoking and
diet how difficult such alterations are.
High-risk groups, then, are required, under pain of law, to alter their social
behavior, not necessarily for their own good, but for the welfare of others. This is
tantamount to asking individuals to behave at the highest stages of moral develop-
ment. Reaching a high level of moral development is a goal most of us will not
attain, 145 and it may be particularly unrealistic to expect vulnerable groups such as
drug users or prostitutes to do so. Society creates harsh legal penalties, dispropor-
tionately applied to vulnerable risk groups, for failure to attain such lofty behavioral
ambitions. Consequently, the law appears unrealistic and inequitable.
The creation of sexual offenses invites intrusion into the private lives of persons,
particularly if they are gay or drug users. It legitimizes the state's interests in the
intimate relations of adults in their homes, hotels, social clubs, and places of
entertainment. It also allows utilization of the numerous components of the criminal
justice system-police surveillance, grand jury investigations, and search warrants.
Enforcement of sexual offenses is controversial not only because of the intimate
behaviors involved, but also because the persons who are most likely to be affected
have a disfavored, sometimes minority, status. The potential for selective and
discriminatory enforcement against certain individuals and groups, and overzealous
intrusion into their lives, is substantial.
A strong campaign of education and counseling to encourage monogamous
relationships, avoidance of prostitutes, and use of barrier protection is likely to
accomplish the public health objective more effectively and equitably.
b. Donation of Blood
Approximately 2% of all cases of HIV are attributable to transfusions of
contaminated blood. 146 This mode of transmission has particularly interested
prosecutors 147 and federal' 48 and state legislators' 49 in the use of coercion, because
it directly affects heterosexual men, women, and children. When the behavior of a
disfavored group such as gays or IV drug users has the potential for seriously harming
a favored group such as heterosexuals and children, calls for compulsion are likely to
be louder.
145. See R. KEAGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF (1982); L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPmENT (1981);
Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND
BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
146. See CDC, Weekly Surveillance Rep., June 6, 1988.
147. The most celebrated case is Joseph Edward Markowski. Mr. Markowski, who had AIDS, sold his blood to a
Los Angeles blood company, Plasma Production Associates. His case was discovered when he approached a bank security
guard, tried to grab his gun and yelled "kill me, kill me, I have AIDS." He told police he had donated his blood on 23
other occassions, but this was never confirmed. He was charged with attempted murder. His case was later dropped for
lack of evidence on intent, but not before receiving widespread publicity. See Gostin, supra note 121.
148. See S. 1352, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REC. S7989-91 (1987) (bill to make it a criminal offense to
donate blood, semen, or organs by a person who knows he is HIV positive or in a high risk group).
149. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-8-7-6 (Supp. 1988) (knowing donation of blood is a felony); Ky. Reg. Sess. 1988
New Laws 557 HB 50 (persons in risk groups who donate or sell blood commit a class D felony); TENN. CODE ANN. §
68-32-104 (1987) (offense to knowingly donate HIV positive blood). California has considered a similar statute.
Cummings, supra note 115.
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The issue of criminalization for intentional donation of infected blood first
emerged in the nationally publicized case of Joseph Markowski, who the prosecution
claimed willingly received a small sum of money in return for a donation to a private
blood collection agency. o5 0 Proving intent in cases of donation of blood is
problematic. It is usually impossible, for example, in the case of a person who is
destitute and gives blood for money, to prove a specific intent to cause death.' 5' The
motive may well be to obtain a sum of money to buy food, drugs, or alcohol, rather
than to harm others. Difficulties of proving that a person fully understood the
consequences of his act and intended to kill some unknown blood recipients are
potentially insurmountable. The circumstances lack a conceivable motive to kill.
The concern with blood donations as a mode of transmission of HIV are
exaggerated. Since 1985 the U.S. blood supply has been screened for HIV antibodies
using an Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA).152 The ELISA is very
sensitive and is highly likely to detect contaminated blood. 53 From 1985 to 1987,
only two cases of HIV-infected blood had escaped detection. During that time
twenty-four million units of blood were screened. 54 The act of selling blood for
which individuals are charged with attempted murder has a minuscule risk of causing
harm.
If the real objective of such prosecutions were to protect the blood supply there
would be many more effective ways to do so. In most of the known cases of
intentional donations of contaminated blood, payments were involved. Indeed, some
private blood collection agencies have shown a blatant disregard for public health.
They often recruit donors in poor, minority areas where there are high incidences of
IV drug use and sexually transmitted diseases. These areas have a disproportionately
high seroprevalence of blood-borne diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis B.155
Private blood collection agencies are largely unregulated and often do not
actively seek to weed out individuals with infection by rigorous questioning and
medical examination. Joseph Markowski, for example, had full-blown AIDSI156 and
was an IV drug user. Either of these conditions probably could have been discovered
if the agency were taking reasonable care. 57
In effect, private blood collection agencies offer a monetary incentive to donate
blood among the poorest members of the community; and because they are
commercial entities interested in buying blood they may take less care in screening
donors. Prohibition or direct regulation of private blood collection enterprises would
150. See supra note 147.
151. Mr. Markowski was reported to say, "I was so hard up for money that I didn't give a damn." Gostin, supra
note 121.
152. See Gostin, Curran & Clark, supra note 12, at 13-17.
153. Id. at 11-13.
154. See Cummings, supra note 115 (quoting Terry Gautier of the American Red Cross).
155. The prevalence of HIV in large, usually poor, urban areas like the Bronx, Newark, or Miami is
disproportionately high. See A Review of Current Knowledge, supra note 3, at 10-11.
156. See supra note 121.
157. IV drug use can be readily detected from examination of the person's arm. Manifestations of symptomatic
carriers of HIV can be detected from examination of swollen glands, rashes, or an emaciated state.
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be more beneficial to the public health than imposing harsh criminal penalties on
HIV-infected donors.158
c. Spitting, Biting, and Splattering of Blood
Spitting, biting, or splattering blood at a person in anger can be a serious assault.
But prosecutors across the country are viewing the same behavior among persons
with HIV as attempted murder or assault with a deadly weapon. 159 By viewing
assaultive behavior as much more serious when exhibited by AIDS patients,
prosecutors make two fundamental errors in judgment: they wrongly assume that
persons with HIV have a desire to kill when they behave irresponsibly, and they
significantly overestimate the danger presented by the behavior.
Many of the cases reported to date involve HIV-infected persons biting, spitting,
or splattering blood during the course of a medical emergency such as following a
suicide attempt. 60 Their intent to murder is supposedly established by words such as
"I want you to know what it is like to die of AIDS."161 Such outbursts are not
uncommon for persons in emergency rooms, hospitals, or closed institutions such as
prisons. The person's behavior can just as easily be attributed to human despair and
frustration, as to the desire to kill. In most cases the police officer, emergency
physician, or medical technician is not even known to the defendant. Those who truly
plan to kill, moreover, do not use the highly indirect means of spitting, biting, or
splattering their blood.
It must also be remembered that in these cases the defendant has a terminal
illness. The hopelessness of the person's condition and the anger involved in
contracting a lethal virus relatively early in life can result in irrational behavior.
Equally important is the fact that HIV has profound neurological effects which can
develop before immunological deterioration can be detected.1 62 However, the extent
158. In many European countries, private blood collection agencies are banned. Another way to help protect the
blood supply would be to develop a verifiable deferral list. Once a person donates positive blood, he would be informed
that he was being placed on a list circulated to all blood collection centers.
159. See supra notes 115-16, 127.
160. The most illuminating case is State v. Haines, cause No. S-5585 (Super. Ct., Tippecanoe County, Indiana 1987
Term). On August 6, 1987, Joseph Haines, having discovered he had an advanced case of AIDS-related complex, tried
to kill himself in his apartment. Police Officer John Dennes entered the apartment and found Haines unconscious, lying
face down in a pool of blood. Two emergency medical technicians arrived, Rodney Jewell and Daniel Garvey. They were
applying pressure to his severely cut wrists when Haines jerked away screaming, "let me die, I have AIDS." He then
got up off the floor, advanced toward them, shouting that he wanted them to know what it was like to have AIDS. He
thrust his arms forward, spraying his blood toward them. None of the emergency personnel has tested positive for HIv.
On January 14, 1988, Haines was convicted on three counts of attempted murder. Circuit Court Judge Vincent F. Grogg
set aside the jury's verdict because Haines' assault "could not constitute a substantial step toward killing." Grogg found
Haines guilty of simple assault and sentenced Haines to three consecutive two year prison terms. See, Gostin, When AIDS
is a Weapon, L.A. Daily Journal, March 3, 1988, at 4, col. 3; Gostin, AIDS and Safety, supra note 120.
161. See State v. Haines, supra note 160. But note the equally important f'rst words in the Haines case, "Let me
die, I have AIDS." Similar expressions of a wish to die are found in other cases. See supra note 147; Squires, supra note
115.
162. Levy & Bredesen, Central Nervous System Dysfunction in Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, I J.
ActQuiRE It!IUNE Dmcimwcv SYNDROME 41 (nearly 40% of AIDS patients develop neurological complications, and about
10% experience neurological symptoms as the initial manifestations of AIDS). See generally Fauci, supra note 108, at
621 (neurologic abnormalities occur in at least 60% of AIDS patients); Ginzberg & Gostin, Legal and Ethical Isues
Associated with HTLV-Il Diseases, 16 PsycHIArmic ANNALS 180, 182 (1986); Ho, Rota, Schooley, Kaplan, Allan,
Groopman, Resnicke, Felsenstein, Andrews & Hirsch, Isolation of HTLV-III from Cerebrospinal Fluid and Neural
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to which intentional or aggressive behavior can be associated with the neurological
defects caused by HIV is not fully understood.
Theoretically, a person could be convicted of attempted murder under the Model
Penal Code if the prosecution successfully proves that he believed his behavior could
kill, and that he intended that result. 163 Although the risk of HIV transmission from
spitting, biting, or splattering of blood is exceedingly remote, 164 the law will treat it
as a seriously dangerous act. Of course prosecutors are concerned with evil intentions
of aggressors and the apprehension of victims. But where the behavior is truly not
dangerous, application of the criminal law appears unjust and unnecessary. 165 It is
unjust because a person should not face serious punishment for a belief which will
cause no harm. 166 Individuals should not be imprisoned for misguided beliefs, but for
seriously dangerous acts. It is unnecessary because the acts which society seeks to
prevent are futile and pose no significant risks to the community. The principal
purpose of the criminal law when applied to a disease epidemic is prevention.
Because this spontaneous, highly emotional behavior is fundamentally irrational, it is
unlikely to be deterred by the criminal law. But even if the criminal law could prevent
such minor assaultive behavior it would have no impact on the epidemic, because
HIV will almost never be transmitted by such behavior.
While transmission of HIV through saliva has never been reported, 167 there have
been two cases of transmission of HIV to health care workers who were soaked with
contaminated blood.168 It is, therefore, a valid goal for public health authorities to
seek to minimize the risk of exposure to contaminated blood. There are more
effective and less restrictive ways to accomplish this objective besides the use of the
criminal law.
The most efficient method of preventing exposure to HIV-infected blood is for
police, corrections officers, firefighters, emergency medical workers, and others to
use rigorous precautions. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have issued
detailed guidelines on prevention of HIV transmission in various settings such as the
workplace, 169 schools, 70 and health care facilities.171 CDC guidelines for health care
workers include all persons whose activities involve contact with patients or with
blood or other body fluids. The CDC recommends universal precautions whenever a
Tissues of Patients with Neurologic Syndromes Related to Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 313 NEv ENG. J. MED.
1538 (1985).
163. See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. supra note 133.
166. Should a person be prosecuted for a criminal attempt because of a harmless belief? "Even though a 'voodoo
doctor' just arrived here from Haiti actually believed that his malediction would surely bring death... I cannot conceive
of an American Court upholding a conviction .... "Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 152-53, 167 A. 344, 348
(1933) (Maxey, J., dissenting). If the means used are so ineffective, a conviction is often thought inappropriate. See A.G.
v. Sillem, 133 Rev. Rep. 731 (Ex. Ch. 1863). See also E. MEEIAN, supra note 133, at 172-74.
167. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
169. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 1111
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MoRBtDrry & MORTALtrrY WEEKLY RsP. 681 (1986).
170. Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
llllLymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORmDrrTY & MORTALTrrY WEEKLY REP. 517 (1985).
171. Recommendations, 1987, 36 (Supp.), supra note 52, at 2S.
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person is likely to have contact with blood or body fluids, whether or not the fluid
is known to be contaminated with HIV. It also urges particular care in emergency
settings "in which the risk of blood exposure is increased and the infection status of
the patient is usually unknown." 7 2
The Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services are developing a far
reaching plan to prevent the transmission of blood-borne diseases. First, these
Departments issued a Joint Advisory Notice on occupational exposure to HIV and
hepatitis B virus (HBV). 17 3 The Notice is applicable to any worker who has a
"predictable job-related requirement" that may involve exposure to blood or body
fluids, such as health care workers, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and other
"first response" emergency wokers.174 Second, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has announced a targeted inspection program to examine
actual workplace compliance with the guidelines. 175 Third, OSHA has given
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in order to protect workers from the risk of
blood-borne diseases.' 76 OSHA purports to act under the "general duty clause" of
the Act, and the existing requirement for personal protective equipment whenever
necessary to control environmental or other workplace hazards. 177
OSHA requirements include the development of special operating procedures
that must be followed in all cases of expected exposure to body fluids. Each worker
must receive education and training on special procedures to be followed and the use
of protective clothing, including gloves, overalls, and eye and face protection.
Many police stations, prisons, and emergency departments across the country
have not implemented OSHA requirements. 178 In the Haines case, police and
emergency personnel responded to a suicide call, knowing the patient was HIV
positive, without any protective clothing or equipment. 179 They applied pressure to a
severely bleeding artery without any covering for their hands or face. Compliance
with CDC guidelines and OSHA requirements would be more effective in preventing
the transmission of blood-borne diseases than prosecutions under the criminal law.
An alternative to a charge of attempted murder is aggravated assault. In United
States v. Moore'80 a federal district court upheld a conviction of assault with a
"deadly" or "dangerous" weapon in connection with the biting of two federal
correctional officers. The court decided there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
172. Id. at 5S.
173. Dep't of Labor and Dep't of Health & Human Services, Joint Advisory Notice, Protection Against
Occupational Exposure to Hepatitis B and Human Immunodeficiency Virus, (Oct. 19, 1987).
174. Id. at 5.
175. 52 Fed. Reg. 41818 (1987) (proposed Oct. 30, 1987).
176. Occupational Exposure to Hepatitis B Virus and Human Immonodeficiency Virus, 52 Fed. Reg. 45438 (1987)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910) (proposed Nov. 27, 1987).
177. Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970, § 654(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982) (requires each employer to
furnish a place of employment which is "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.").
178. See, e.g., Judis, An AIDS Nightmare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1988, 6 (Magazine), at 32 (police and emergency
workers soaked in blood when handling a brutal murder).
179. See supra note 140. The rescue workers covered the wound with their bare hands.
180. 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987).
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conviction because the defendant tested positive for HIV, HIV could be transmitted
through bodily fluids, and blood was sometimes present in the mouth.
The reasoning in Moore is flawed. A dangerous or deadly weapon is an object
that is "used in a manner likely to endanger life or [cause] serious bodily harm."''8
Scientific evidence clearly shows the absence of any "likelihood" that a human bite
would endanger life or cause serious physical harm through transmission of HIV.
Systematic epidemiologic investigations of persons exposed to small amounts of HIV
infected saliva or blood demonstrate that there have been no documented cases of
transmission from biting; that saliva may block transmissibility; and that even
sustained exposures do not result in serological conversion.1 82 The federal district
court, then, accepted evidence of a theoretical possibility of serious harm as sufficient
to prove a likelihood. The Supreme Court, in a related context, has stressed the
importance of basing legal decisions on scientific probabilities rather than remote,
unforeseeable risks. 183
In a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, the weapon is a potentially
lethal microbe. Because that microbe can potentially be isolated in most, if not all,
bodily fluids, prosecutors wrongly assume that a person's saliva, blood, and mucous
are deadly. It follows that what would ordinarily be regarded as minor assaultive
behavior such as spitting, biting, kicking, or splattering blood becomes a felony if the
person harbors the human immunodeficiency virus. The mischief of this approach is
that the same behavior which many people exhibit in anger, frustration, or despair
becomes a potentially serious crime because of the person's health status. Such minor
assaultive behavior can be witnessed almost daily in hospital emergency rooms,
closed and overcrowded institutions such as prisons or hospitals for the mentally ill
or retarded, and on sports fields when a player is angry with another player or the
umpire.
A human bite is clearly a battery and the law can and should prevent such
crimes. But to raise this behavior to a very serious offense because of the person's
health status is misguided. I suggest that the reason for the new spate of charges of
aggravated assault in relation to HIV has more to do with misbelief and prejudice than
any clearly thought out position on culpability or degree of danger involved. The
same minor assaultive behavior of persons with other blood-borne diseases such as
hepatitis B (HBV) occurs with equal regularity. Transmission of HBV is much more
efficient and is likely to result in higher overall morbidity and mortality from a bite
or splattering of blood; 184 yet, no prosecutions for deadly assault have been reported
against HBV carriers.
The reason for the differences in society's treatment of these two comparable
181. United States v. Hollow, 747 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1984).
182. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
183. School ad. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 1913 (1987). See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Lettau, Smith, Williams, Lundquist, Cruz, Sikes & Hadler, Transmission of Hepatitis B with
Resultant Restriction of Surgical Practice, 255 J. A.M.A. 934 (1986) (Five patients contracted HBV after surgery,
directly attributable to surgeon. Surgeon still permitted to practice using infection control until a further case of HBV
transmission was discovered.).
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diseases is that AIDS has developed a special mystique. Public apprehension of
transmissibility from aggressive behavior is out of proportion to the real risks
involved.
2. Reckless or Negligent Transmission
One of the principal difficulties with criminalization of intentional or knowing
transmission of HIV is that the requisite mental states often cannot be proved.
Criminal charges can also be brought against an individual for recklessness, or even
negligence, in connection with HIV transmission. The problem here is not so much
inadequate proof, but that too many people would be swept into the criminal justice
system.
A person acts recklessly under the Model Penal Code when he "consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk"1 85 and a person acts negligently when
he "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk." 8 6 Disregarding that risk
for a reckless or negligent act must involve "a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding"1 87 or "reasonable" 88 person would observe in a similar
situation.
Crimes involving recklessness or negligence cast a very wide net. They could
include not only persons who test positive for HIV, but also people in high risk
groups. The criminal law could, therefore, impact on a very large population
engaging in sexual activity. 89
The great majority of the population is aware that AIDS is a sexually transmitted
disease and that it is lethal. 190 If a person knows he is seropositive and, nonetheless,
engages in sexual intercourse, he is consciously disregarding a known risk, which can
be considered reckless behavior. At the very least he should be aware of that risk,
which can be negligent behavior.
Opinion polls also show that most of the population knows that gays and IV drug
users are at high risk for AIDS. 19 1 It is conceivable that the criminal law would hold
gays and IV drug users accountable not only for what they know, but also for what
they reasonably should know. If a person has engaged in high risk behavior and failed
to be tested, 192 the courts could put him in the same position as if he knew he were
seropositive. Any other rule of law would provide an incentive to avoid being tested
or counseled.
Thus, if a person tests positive for HIV or knows he is in a high-risk group, and
185. MODEL. PEAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
186. Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
187. Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
188. Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
189. See generally Sullivan & Field, supra note 1, at 164.
190. Polls consistently show that 98-99% of the public know about AIDS, and up to 93-95% know it is sexually
transmitted. Singer, Rogers & Corcoran, The Polls-A Report, AIDS 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 580, 584, 588 (1987).
191. Id. at 586.
192. The Centers for Disease Control strongly advises persons in high risk groups to be tested. Additional
Recommendations to Reduce Sexual and Drug Abuse-Related Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
HIllLymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 35 MotBiDrry & MoRTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 152 (1986) [hereinafter Additional
Recommendations].
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has sexual intercourse, he is potentially committing a criminal offense under a
recklessness or negligence standard. The question will arise whether sexual inter-
course by a person who knew, or reasonably should have known, he was HIV
positive is always reckless or negligent. Put in terms expressed by the Model Penal
Code, is sexual intercourse by a person at risk always a "gross deviation" from the
standard of conduct a law abiding or reasonable person would observe? 9 3 Public
health options for persons at risk for HIV are not limited to abstinence. Health
education efforts acknowledge that it may be reasonable for a person at risk to have
sex, provided he discloses the risk to his partner and engages in "safer sex"
practices.1 94 A strong argument could be made that no crime is committed if public
health advice is followed, because the person has not grossly deviated from
acceptable societal standards.
There are two major problems with using a recklessness or negligence test for
criminalizing HIV transmission. First, there are potentially millions of people who
come within recognized risk groups who could be susceptible to criminal charges. 195
There is no clear advance notice given to these individuals as to what behavior will
be treated as an offense; the prospect exists that any sexual or needle sharing behavior
of persons in these groups would be viewed as a criminal act, at least by some
prosecutors and juries. The potential for widespread use of the criminal law would
chill cooperation with public health programs, and legitimize prejudice and moral
disapproval of already disfavored populations.
Second, an approach based upon recklessness or negligence would fail to target
only those who engage in truly blameworthy behavior. For example, a person
engaging in a long-term, loving relationship could "recklessly" or "negligently"
transmit HIV to his partner, even though he had no intention whatsoever of causing
him harm. Using a vague and far-reaching standard of recklessness or negligence
could punish individuals who have no evil or antisocial intentions.
B. Public Health or AIDS-Specific Offenses
The substantial difficulties involved in prosecuting AIDS cases under the
traditional criminal law have led state legislators to consider specific public health
offenses. Criminal offenses are commonly found in old infectious disease and
venereal disease statutes. Some statutes create an offense for transmission of any
communicable disease, while others are limited only to specified sexually transmitted
diseases. Many venereal disease statutes do not apply to HIV because of the way
AIDS is classified. 196
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
194. See Additional Recommendations, supra note 192.
195. The CDC lists a wide range of groups that are at high risk for HIV including homosexual and bisexual men,
past and present IV drug users, persons with signs or symptoms of AIDS or ARC, persons born in Haiti and countries
in Central America where heterosexual transmission has occurred, male and female prostitutes, sex partners of infected
persons, hemophiliacs who have received blood-clotting products, and children of infected mothers. W. CUtArN, L.
GosTIN & M. CLARK, supra note 68, at 224-25. Are all of these individuals obliged in law to be tested? If they are not
tested and have sexual intercourse, is that sufficient to establish recklessness or negligence?
196. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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One commentator has criticized the old public health laws as ineffective,
unusable, and punitive (targeting "easy" populations such as prostitutes).197 Such
statutes have rarely been used. Undaunted by this historical perspective, state
legislators are reclassifying HIV to include the virus within existing public health law
offenses or are enacting new AIDS-specific statutes. The new statutes follow the
same model as old public health law offenses, but many authorize more restrictive
sentencing. While the old statutes tended to have a mild "public health" sanction, 98
levying a fine or a very short prison sentence, modern AIDS-specific offenses make
HIV transmission a felony. 199
The numerous problems of prosecuting under the traditional criminal law have
been reviewed. 200 Is it possible to prove that a person intended to kill a partner
through the indirect method of sexual intercourse or sharing a needle? How real a
possibility of transmission must exist before a prosecution can be successful? Does it
matter if the virus is not actually transmitted and the "victim" is left unharmed? Is
the fact that the person disclosed his HIV status and/or used a condom relevant? Can
a person's mouth or teeth be regarded as a "deadly" weapon? What behavior is
"reckless" or "negligent?" Should all high risk groups be included whether or not
they actually test positive for HIV? Many, if not all, of these "nice" jurisprudential
questions can be avoided by using statutes which clearly define the behavior they seek
to punish. By creating a specific statute, legislators make it easier to convict in cases
in which the individual is engaging in truly dangerous behavior and also give clearer
notice to persons about the behavioral norms to which society expects them to
conform.
In formulating a specific public health statute, legislators should inquire what
behavior may reasonably be proscribed as criminal by society. Such a statute would
not be concerned with particular levels of mental intent and culpability. 20 Rather, it
would narrowly target those behaviors which were truly dangerous and which the
criminal law might reasonably be expected to deter. Accordingly, the statute would
be concerned only with the two primary modes of HIV transmission-sexual
intercourse and the sharing of contaminated needles. It would not ban all sex and drug
use of HIV- infected people. Such a course would be unrealistic and unfair. It would
be unrealistic to expect individuals to forego all sexual contacts and use of drugs for
their entire lives. Society has never had success in enforcing similar outright bans in
the past.202
Banning all sex and drug use would also be unfair because sexuality is necessary
197. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
198. See Curran, Gostin & Clark, supra note 12.
199. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1988) (any person exposing another intentionally or knowingly
commits a felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison, a fine of up to $5000 or both).
200. See supra notes 131-195 and accompanying text.
201. It has been proposed that AIDS-specific statutes should follow a classic culpability approach. Robinson, AIDS
and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HoFSrRA L. REv. 91 (1985). But such
a statute would retain virtually all of the problems with a traditional criminal law approach. See Sullivan & Field, supra
note 1, at 178-82.
202. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text; Fineberg, Education to Prevent AIDS: Prospects and
Obstacles, 239 ScErcE 592, 596 (1988).
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for human contentment and gratification and because persons who use drugs are often
physically dependent on them.20 3 Further, such a ban would not be narrowly tailored
to combat the harm intended under the statute. Sharing a needle after it has been
sterilized with bleach and having sexual intercourse using barrier protection are not
highly dangerous acts, although they do pose a lower level risk.
Finally, where a partner is informed of the person's HIV status and consents,
there should be no criminal penalty for sexual intercourse or needle sharing. Criminal
statutes should not unnecessarily restrict sexual freedoms and should criminalize only
culpable acts. Society may well believe that interference with an intimate relationship
where both partners give a fully informed consent is unnecessary and unjust.
A specific public health statute, therefore, would seek to change behavior of
people who were infected with HIV by requiring them to give certain information and
take certain precautions before engaging in well-defined dangerous behavior. A
statute, following this conception, would make it a criminal offense only if all of the
following elements were present: 1) the person knows he is HIV positive and has been
apprised by a health care professional or public health official not to engage in unsafe
sexual or needle sharing behavior; 2) the person does not notify his partner of his HIV
status or does not use barrier protection against exchange of body fluids; and 3) the
person engages in sexual intercourse or needle sharing. To establish the offense, it
would not be necessary to prove either an intent to harm or that HIV was actually
transmitted.
The proposed test is the most acceptable formulation of a criminal standard for
HIV transmission: it is based upon objective fact and not moral judgment, it is
narrowly targeted to the most dangerous modes of transmission, and it allows
vulnerable risk group members to engage in their private lives without state
interference provided they obtain an informed consent from their partner or use
barrier protection.
Several recent public health acts authorize substantial prison sentences for
breach of the statute. 2°4 Such draconian measures are wholly inconsistent with the
goal of a public health statute. Since those statutes appear in public health, not penal
codes, their rationale should be different. The objective should not be retribution and
sentences should not appear punitive. 20 5 Mild public health sanctions such as fines,
supervision, or attendance orders or, as a last resort, short prison sentences are more
appropriate to the public health objective. The reasons are threefold. First, the state's
purpose is to set a behavioral boundary to prevent transmission of disease, not to be
overly concerned with culpability and moral judgment. The public health statute says
nothing about whether the person deserves punishment because of his evil intentions.
Where such evil intentions can be proven, and a retributive sentence is justified, the
state should be required to bring a traditional criminal law prosecution such as
attempted murder. Retribution is only justified if the sufficient criminal intent can be
proven.
203. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 140, 199 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
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Second, there is no evidence that the imposition of a stiff criminal penalty will
be more effective in preventing dangerous behavior. Most defendants will be
terminally ill themselves, and are unlikely to be deterred by a potential felony, as
opposed to a misdemeanor, conviction. Nor would there be much public support for
harsh sentences of terminally ill individuals.
Finally, the state ought to tread carefully in applying harsh criminal sentences in
the deeply private sphere of sexuality or in the underground world of shooting
galleries. These are activities which do not respond well to a punitive approach
because they are, in part, biologically driven or habitual. 20 6
There is a growing consensus among public health authorities that if coercion is
to be used at all in the AIDS epidemic, a narrowly focused, nonpunitive approach
such as the one proposed would be preferable. 20 7 To be sure, such a statute would not
address the core problems of the spread of HIV, but the inability or unwillingness of
authorities to deal with such hard cases may undermine confidence in those who are
entrusted with the protection of public health. 208
The best case for criminalization of HIV, then, would be a specific public health
statute. But it may well be a mistake to venture into any criminal law solution to a
disease epidemic. The fundamental error of a specific criminal statute lies in the fact
that it specifically addresses a subject (sexuality) which is deeply private and
sensitive, and targets unpopoular populations (prostitutes, gays, and IV drug users).
By doing so, society risks significant abuse of the organs of law enforcement and
criminal justice. A statute addressing sexually transmitted disease legitimizes police
interest in intimate sexual activities: how partners are chosen, what was said, what
precautions were taken. Such a statute also provides an outlet for society's moral
distaste for prostitution, drug abuse, and homosexuality. Entrusting police, prosecu-
tors, and juries to detect, enforce, and adjudicate these laws invites unwarranted
intrusions into privacy, and victimization of unpopular groups.
An AIDS-specific statute also has the effect of separating HIV from the
mainstream of communicable disease control. HIV is a virus which has many unique
features. But public health measures designed to impede the spread of HIV should not
be fundamentally different from those aimed at other viral infections. 20 9 Risking
transmission of HIV is no more dangerous than risking transmission of many other
serious communicable diseases. By enacting laws which apply only to AIDS,
legislators will further stigmatize carriers and raise apprehension among the public.
The central question of whether the criminal law, in any form, should be
applicable to HIV transmission is whether any legitimate societal goal would be
served.
206. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
207. See PRESIDETMAL Cow m'N REP., supra note 114; A.M.A. Council, supra note 114.
208. UPDATE 1988, supra note 3, at 83.
209. See Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 Am. J. LAW & MED. 461 (1986).
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C. Goals of the Criminal Law
The overarching policy question in determining whether the criminal law is an
appropriate model to apply to the AIDS epidemic is whether it serves some important
public purpose. Each of the usual rationales for the criminal law-retribution,
incapacitation, and deterrence-appear ill-suited to deal with a disease epidemic.
There is an understandable outrage when any citizen acts maliciously to place
another's life in jeopardy. But apart from those rare cases where a person consciously
decides to use the virus to kill, there would be little public support for retribution for
transmission of a virus. Persons who transmit HIV are also infected themselves and
will probably die from AIDS. Thus, if punishment were to be sought, it would be
directed against a terminally ill patient. Sometimes, if a person has only a short time
to live, it can even provide a justification for discontinuing a prosecution.210 Further,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is very difficult to establish that the accused
had evil intentions deserving punishment. It is more often the case that the person
took unreasonable risks motivated by sexual passions, physical dependence on drugs,
or both. The application of a retributive criminal law model to a disease epidemic
would likely be strongly opposed by public health authorities and distrusted by
persons most vulnerable to infection.
Even those responsible for prosecuting cases of HIV transmission reject
retribution as a rationale. 211 Instead, they argue for incapacitation. Incapacitation can
be defined as the right or duty of society to incarcerate a dangerous individual to
prevent him from doing harm, at least while he is deprived of liberty. It is certainly
understandable to seek to isolate an individual engaging in dangerous behavior. But
the danger is caused by a retrovirus that will remain in his body potentially for life.
Any incapacitation during the period of "danger," therefore, can be lifelong. This
potential life sentence is unjust when directed against an individual for public health
"crimes" such as having sex or sharing needles. More importantly, because the
person continues to be infectious once he is imprisoned, he is not incapacitated at all.
The decision to incarcerate only shifts the risk to a new, probably more vulnerable,
population. The problem of homosexuality, rape, and drug use in prisons may make
it more, not less, likely that the virus will be transmitted.
Probably the most important goal of the criminal law in the context of a disease
epidemic is deterrence. The best that can be hoped for is that the threat of criminal
sanctions will prevent people from taking unreasonable risks that could trasmit the
virus. The criminal law is not a likely vehicle for deterring such behavior. In most
cases where the criminal law has been used against AIDS carriers there was no motive
or advanced planning. Spontaneous behavior driven by human anguish, despair, or
passion is difficult to prevent. Further, persons infected with HIV are dying, and a
long prison sentence is unlikely to be a deterrent. It is hard to envisage that a person
who only has months or years to live would fundamentally alter enjoyable behavior
210. See New York v. Camargo, 135 Misc. 2d 987, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (N.Y. criminal court
ruled that in the interests of justice it was discontinuing the prosecution of a defendant charged with the sale of cocaine
because he was bedridden with AIDS and had only months to live).
211. See Squires, supra note 1.
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because of the threat of a criminal prosecution. The person might be just as likely to
continue the risky practices, but be certain not to confide in his physician, counselor,
or sex partner. Use of the criminal law in cases of AIDS transmission, then, is
unlikely to serve a valid public purpose.
V. SUMMARY
This Article has examined the charged issue of whether a person who risks AIDS
transmission should be subject to coercive state action. This is not simply an
academic question, for state legislators have already enacted laws which authorize
isolation and criminal prosecution of "recalcitrant" AIDS carriers, and prosecutors
have already filed criminal charges in numerous cases.
The reasons society has been attracted to coercive measures are understandable.
A deliberate or reckless decision to endanger another person's life is deplorable.
Public health officials have sometimes appeared uncaring or impotent in dealing with
highly visible cases of persons who act in wilful disregard of the value of human life.
The use of compulsion provides an outlet for the rage and frustration society has for
these "hard" cases.
The use of coercive powers, far from accomplishing its mission of impeding the
spread of the AIDS epidemic, could well fuel it. Coercive powers would not go to the
core of the problem. The overwhelming majority of cases of HIV transmission are
outside the reach of legal control mechanisms and will go unnoticed. Those who do
come to the attention of the police and public health officials are likely to be the
poorest, least articulate of those harboring the virus. Indeed, there is ample historical
evidence to demonstrate that coercive powers have almost exclusively been used
against unpopular targets such as prostitutes; and even when used against large
numbers of subjects, compulsory powers have not altered the course of disease
epidemics.23 2
The reasons coercive powers are inappropriate to control the spread of disease
are that they often fail to discriminate between unsubstantiated fears, or even
loathing, of high-risk groups, and truly dangerous behavior; they are unlikely to deter
highly ingrained human sexual or needle sharing behavior; and they cause a loss of
trust and confidence by vulnerable populations who will not cooperate with essential
public health programs of education, counseling, and treatment.
Most compulsory powers do not focus narrowly on significant health risks. They
sweep in nondangerous behavior such as spitting, biting, or splattering of blood,
along with more dangerous behavior such as sexual intercourse and needle sharing.
Prevention of very low risk behaviors will not have any effect on the AIDS epidemic,
even assuming that such spontaneous behavior could be prevented by the threat of
coercive action.
Compulsory public health powers are unlikely to be efficacious in preventing
even dangerous acts such as unprotected sexual intercourse and needle sharing. Both
are highly resistant to change. Sexuality, including prostitution, is driven by a
212. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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complicated set of biological, psychological, and social forces, and drug use is often
physically addicting. Prostitution, drug use, and often sodomy are already unlawful,
and it is doubtful whether new criminal offenses or isolation for HIV transmission
would serve as a deterrent. The value of coercive laws as a deterrent is diminished
further by the fact that AIDS is a terminal condition. Persons with catastrophic
illnesses may be just as likely to continue their enjoyable activities quietly as they
would be to give them up for fear of punishment.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that widespread use of coercion against
AIDS carriers would make it more difficult to combat the disease. The argument that
coercion will drive the epidemic underground is well rehearsed. But it may be one
thing to require a person to be tested, and quite another to deprive a person of his
liberty for having sexual intercourse or sharing a needle-behaviors he, and others,
have engaged in throughout adulthood. It will very much be in the interests of risk
group members not to know if they have the virus and not to discuss their sexual or
needle sharing contacts with counselors or physicians. The last thing that public
health officials want is a population that is frightened of punitive solutions to their
health problems.
The use of compulsion, then, is unlikely to be effective in impeding the spread
of HIV, and may even exacerbate public health problems. Balanced against the
marginal benefit of compulsion are the potential intrusions into the private lives of
vulnerable populations. If persons at risk for HIV are prohibited from engaging in
unprotected sex or drug use, then police and public health authorities have a
corresponding duty to enforce these prohibitions. Isolation or criminal statutes open
the door to surveillance of intimate relationships where there is an expectation of
privacy.
The concern is not only that compulsory measures are directed at intensely
private affairs. It is also that the primary targets of coercion are traditionally
unpopular groups-gays, drug users, and prostitutes, disproportionately represented
by racial minorities. Police, prosecutors, and juries may base their decisions, in part,
on "vague, undifferentiated fears" or on "irrational prejudice.' ' 213 Worse, they may
succumb to a "bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group. ' '2 4
Public policy aimed at isolating or criminalizing AIDS transmission may appear
to be getting tough with the disease. But they divert our attention and resources from
the policies that would make a real difference-focused education, testing, counsel-
ing, and treatment for drug dependency.
213. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985).
214. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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